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INTRODUCTION

[T]he Constitution is the rock upon which our nation rests. We must follow
it not only when it is convenient, but when fear and danger beckon in a
different direction. To do less would diminish us and undermine the
foundation upon which we stand.'
The United States government's preventive counterterrorism strategy is no
secret.2 Weeks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, former Attorney General John
Ashcroft declared,
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa-even
by one day-we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put
in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every available
statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage ....

Our single

objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off
the street.3
As the U.S. government adopted a no-tolerance policy to apprehending the
terrorists, a fear-stricken public watched images of nefarious, dark-skinned, and
bearded Muslims flash across millions of television screens. The message was,
if there had ever been any doubt, that the 9/11 attacks confirmed Muslims and
Arabs are inherently violent and intent on destroying the American way of life.

1.
United States v. Ghailani, No. SlO 98 Crim. 1023(LAK), 2010 WL 4006381, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010).
See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 26-33 (2007) (explaining
2.
the government's "preventative" approach of detaining people based on "group identity or
political affiliations"); President George W. Bush, Address Before the United States Military
Academy Graduating Class (June 1, 2002) ("If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we
will have waited too long .... [T]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive.")
(transcript, video recording, and audio recording available at THE WHITE HOUSE, http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (last visited
Jan. 5, 2012)). Attorney General John Ashcroft prepared the following statement:
In order to fight and to defeat terrorism, the Department of Justice has added a new
paradigm to that of prosecution-a paradigm of prevention . ...

Our new,

international goal of terrorism prevention ... involves anticipation and
imagination about emerging scenarios, the puzzle pieces of which have yet to
come into alignment.
John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 10,
2003) (prepared remarks available at U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/archive/
ag/speeches/2003/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2012)).
3.
John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks Before the United States Conference of
Mayors (Oct. 25, 2001) (prepared remarks available at U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks 1025.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2012)).
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Heightened government scrutiny of these communities was not only warranted,
but a rational4 response to a perceived existential threat to the country.
Ten years later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have transformed the American
way of life for the worse. 5 In the hasty passage of the expansive USA
PATRIOT Act ("PATRIOT Act"), 6 our fears gave way to the government's
demand for unfettered discretion to preserve national security at the expense of
civil liberties for all Americans. As a consequence, America has come to
resemble a police state where government surveillance extends into almost
every aspect of life.8
Body scans at airports strip us of our privacy. Fusion centers have sprung
up across the country, gathering intelligence on average Americans and
depositing it into massive databases monitored by the government. 9
Warrantless National Security Letters gather in-depth information about our
4.
See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 767-74 (arguing that
the mainstream, institutionalized discourse defines racism as irrational because it is the
"distortion of reason through the prism of myth and ignorance," and because it clouds
perception "with beliefs rooted in superstition"; hence, selective targeting based on reason or
rational characteristics cannot be racist).
5.
See, e.g., Evan Perez, Rights Are Curtailedfor Terror Suspects, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870405020457621897065
2119898.html?mod=WSJ hpLEFTTopStories (highlighting the Obama administration's
new policy curtailing Miranda rights for terror suspects and suggesting that it may erode
Miranda rights for ordinary criminal defendants as the FBI expands discretion regarding
when to invoke the new policy).
6.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
7.
See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, A Prime Aim of the Growing Surveillance State,
SALON.COM (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:20 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/08/19/surveillance 13/
(examining various governmental "efforts over the past several years to heighten
surveillance powers" and "control ... the flow of information").
8.
See, e.g., Richard Knox, Protests Mount over Safety and Privacy of Airport
Scanners, NPR (Nov. 12, 2010, 3:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/11/12/
131275949/protests-mount-over-safety-and-privacy-of-airport-scanners.
9.

MICHAEL GERMAN & JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHAT'S

WRONG WITH FUSION CENTERS? 3 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. Fusion centers are "state, local and regional institutions
... originally created to improve the sharing of anti-terrorism intelligence among different
... law enforcement agencies." Id Each individual center emerged and developed
independently, and for many, the scope of their mission has expanded dramatically, as has
the scope of the information they collect and analyze. Id. Participation in the centers has
"grown to include not just law enforcement, but other government entities, the military, and
even select members of the private sector," leading to serious privacy concerns. Id.; see
Thomas Cincotta, Intelligence Fusion Centers: A De-Centralized National Intelligence
Agency, PUB. EYE (Winter 2009/Spring 2010), http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n4/
intelligence-fusion-centers.html.
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financial and political lives absent any evidence of criminal activity.10 Police
departments have shifted resources from crime fighting to mapping
communities based on their religious faith and ethnic origins, ostensibly to
Overreaching enforcement of broad "material
protect national security."
support to terrorism" laws has chilled religiously mandated charitable giving
and humanitarian aid operations, thereby eroding the independence of the
American nonprofit sector and unduly politicizing humanitarian assistance.12
Fears of pervasive "homegrown terrorism," fueled by irresponsible
congressional rhetoric,' have legitimized bigoted discourse about Muslims in
America to the extent that some Americans challenge the status of Islam as a
bona fide religion deserving of constitutional protection.14
At first blush, the preventive paradigm appears legitimate. Few would
contest the collective public safety interests in stopping terrorism before it
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2006) (requiring third-party disclosure if the
information sought is merely "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities" (emphasis added)).
11.
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC
INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE § 4, at 21-38 (2008), available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/the-new-operations-manual-from-the-fb-i/original.pdf (permitting mapping of communities based on race or ethnicity so long as it
does not serve as the sole basis for monitoring specific communities). Despite the persistent
economic slowdown, the Department of Justice requested over $300 million in program
increases for the 2011 fiscal year to "strengthen national security and counter the threat of
terrorism." Strengthen NationalSecurity and Counter the Threat of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011factsheets/pdf/national-security-counter-terrorism.
pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
12.
For extensive information about the adverse impacts that material support to
terrorism laws have had on the nonprofit sector, see Negative Impacts of Post 9/11
CounterterrorismMeasures on Charities,Donors and the People They Serve, CHARITY &
SEC. NETWORK NEWSL. (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/system/files/
Impact%20of/o2OCounterterrorism%20Measures%20on%20Charities%20Donors%20and%
20the%2OPeople%20the%2OServe.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Police in Los Angeles Step up Efforts to Gain
Muslims' Trust, N.Y TIMEs, Mar. 10, 2011, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/10/us/10muslims.html (reporting that Representative Peter King said "American
Muslims do not cooperate" with law enforcement); Scott Shane, For Lawmaker Examining
Terror, a Pro-I.R.A. Past, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 9, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/03/09/us/politics/09king.html (reporting that Representative Peter King
asserted eighty-five percent of American mosque leaders "hold extremist views").
14. See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 1, Estes v.
Rutherford Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n, No. 1OCV-1443 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Oct. 18, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/murfreesboroamicus10-1810.pdf ("Plaintiffs have put into controversy whether Islam is a religion and whether a
mosque is entitled to treatment as a place of religious assembly for legal purposes.").
15. Derived from Attorney General John Ashcroft's remarks, see Ashcroft, supra
note 2, the phrase "preventive paradigm" has been used to describe the ideology behind the
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occurs. Even so, on what grounds should the government be permitted to
investigate individuals? Does mere political dissent, even if virulently antiAmerican, or unpopular orthodox religious practices suffice to subject
individuals to increased scrutiny, or worse, loss of liberty? At what point does
legitimate counterterrorism become political and religious persecution? The
answers determine the type of country we want to live in-a free and just
society consistent with the Founding Fathers' vision, or a paranoid society
dislodged from fundamental principles of fairness and the rule of law.
While post-9/11 preventive counterterrorism policies have adversely
impacted various groups of Americans, no group has been more Frofoundly
affected than the Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities.
Mosque
infiltration has become so rampant that some congregants assume they are
under surveillance as they fulfill their religious obligations.' 7 Government
informants have ensnared numerous, seemingly hapless and unsophisticated
young men such that Muslims no longer know whom they can trust among
each other.
Aggressive prosecutions of Muslim charities and individuals
U.S. government's "sweeping" response to 9/11 -an ideology that has "justiflied] the
coercive use of state power to preventively detain suspected terrorists, to engage in
extraordinary rendition of suspects to foreign states, to interrogate detainees, and to go to
war against Iraq." Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc
Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1407, 1407 (2007).
16.
For a general description of the distinctions between the Arab, Muslim, Middle
Eastern, Sikh, and South Asian communities, see Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the
Words that Hurt: EntrenchedStereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33,
43-48 (2009).
17. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims' Distrust of FBI,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 5, 2010, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403720.html (reporting on how the FBI's use of a
mosque infiltrator backfired); Thomas Watkins, Suit Claims FBI Violates Muslims' Rights at
Mosque, ABC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12977749
("Plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the FBI said . .. that the agency's use of a paid informant to
infiltrate California mosques has left them and other Muslims with an enduring fear that their
phones and e-mails are being screened and their physical whereabouts monitored."); see also
Salvador Hernandez, Judge: FBI Lied, but Documents About Muslims Stay Secret, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/documents-298500-fbigovernment.html ("Documents connected to [FBI] surveillance of several Islamic
organizations and Muslim leaders will not be released, but a federal judge strongly rebuked
the government for lying about the existence of the documents to the federal court.").
18. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Newburgh Terrorism Case May Establish a Line
for Entrapment, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A25, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/06/16/nyregion/16terror.html (reporting that an FBI informant allegedly entrapped four
young Muslim men with "promises of a $250,000 payment and a BMW," convincing them
to plan synagogue bombings and military-plane shootings, despite the four men being "so illequipped to plan an attack that none had a driver's license or a car"); Amanda Ripley, The
Fort Dix Conspiracy, TIME, Dec. 17, 2007, at 46, available at http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1691609,00.html (commenting on allegations that an FBI informant
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across the country have embittered communities that now feel under siege by
their government and distrusted by their non-Muslim compatriots.19 Selective
counterterrorism fuels public bias, as evidenced by the vitriolic discourse
surrounding the Park 51 Community Center in lower Manhattan in 2010.20 As
a consequence, the vibrancy and development of civil society within these
communities has been significantly stunted.21 Current counter-terrorism efforts
thus attack the social relationships, as well as the civil liberties, long
understood as the glue holding this country together.
This article focuses on three powerful components of the government's
counterterrorism preventive paradigm and the significant risks they pose to
civil rights and civil liberties. Part I examines the adverse consequences of the
government's use of religiosity as a proxy for terrorism. Specifically, the
current preventative paradigm for countering terrorism risks the First
Amendment infringement of protected activities and misdirects limited law
enforcement resources away from criminal activity.22 In addition to wasting
limited resources, religious and racial profiling erodes trust between law
enforcement and Muslim communities. To the extent constructive relations
between communities and law enforcement bolster public safety, the

"brainwashed" and tricked six young men accused of plotting an attack on Fort Dix: "if the
rumors of entrapment become so corrosive that no one in the Muslim-American community
feels safe talking to the FBI, then the government has lost its best potential ally"); see also
CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TARGETED AND
ENTRAPPED: MANUFACTURING THE "HOMEGROWN THREAT" IN THE UNITED STATES 19-38
(2011),
available
at
http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/targetedandentrapped.pdf
(documenting multiple cases where government informants played a leading role in planning
and implementing attempted terrorist acts, thereby raising concerns of de facto entrapment of
Muslim targets).
19. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY:
CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE "WAR ON TERRORISM FINANCING" 118-20
(2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith.pdf (discussing the
alienation of Muslim Americans as a result of government actions toward Muslim charities
and donors).
20. See, e.g., Imam's Wife Tells ofDeath Threats,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A20,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/nyregion/04daisy.html?ref-park51
(reporting the death threats made against a Park 51 imam and his wife).
21.
See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in
Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REv. 833, 851-67 (2011) (arguing that current
counterterrorism policies result in two First Amendment-related harms: (1) "individuals may
experience a chilling effect on speech and association," and (2) "religious communities may
be burdened by constraints on the autonomy to debate and cultivate unique distinctive
religious views").
22. For a comprehensive analysis of the preventive paradigm and its injurious impact
on Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in America, see COLE & LOBEL, supra note 2, at 2658.
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government has an interest in curtailing arbitrary and overreaching
counterterrorism enforcement. 23
Part II demonstrates the government's aggressive use of "material support"
laws found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and B as a prosecutorial fallback against
individuals that otherwise cannot be shown to have participated in terrorism. 24
For example, in 2009 the Center on Law and Security at New York University
School of Law found that defendants had been charged with § 2339B "[i]n 11
indictments, comprising four cases ... either alone or in association with lesser
statutes."25 The far-reaching and devastating effects of these broadly
interpreted laws-felt by American Muslim charities, Muslim donors, and the
broader American nonprofit sector-are the effective criminalization of
otherwise legitimate charitable giving, peacebuilding, and human rights
advocacy.26 As a result, the fear of inviting unwanted government scrutiny
chills religious freedom rights and deters Muslims from fully practicing their
faith.27 In addition to calling for more judicious enforcement of material
support laws, this paper argues for a specific intent requirement in §§ 2339A
and 2339B as a means of ensuring innocent but unpopular individuals are not
targeted for prosecution.
Part III focuses on the most recent and troubling developments in the
preventive paradigm-the racial subtext of homegrown terrorism as a
"Muslims only" club. The current debate over homegrown terrorism facilitates
selective and arbitrary enforcement of counterterrorism laws against Muslims,
23. But see discussion infra Part I.E (addressing the flaws in community outreach
programs).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (Supp. IV 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION STATISTICS ON UNSEALED INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND TERRORISM-RELATED CONVICTIONS 1 (2010), availableat http://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=25289 ("Category II cases include offenses such as those involving fraud,
immigration, firearms, drugs, false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice, as well as
general conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371.").
25. CTR. FOR LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2011-SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, at 50 (2010) (noting that such indictments
"illuminate the concerns that are raised by the broad phrasing of the material support
statute"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 24.
26. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
27. Take, for example, a report involving a barber-shop police raid:
Strangers loitered across the street from the [Muslim-owned] cafe in this Brooklyn
neighborhood. Quiet men would hang around for hours, listening to other
[predominantly Muslim] customers. Once police raided the barber shop next door,
searched through the shampoos and left. Customers started staying away for fear
of ending up on a blacklist, and eventually Ahmad had to close the place.
Chris Hawley, Law May Not Be on Muslims'Side in NYPD Intel Case, SALON.COM (Nov. 8,
2011, 11:31 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/11/08/law-maynot-beonmuslims-side
innypd intel case.
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while many non-Muslims commit or attempt to commit deadly acts of terror
undetected. 28 Notwithstanding the rise in terrorism by militias and right wing
extremists, law enforcement has developed counterterrorism strategies based on
essentialist stereotypes of terrorists as religious Muslims. 29 Some congressional
leaders have followed suit by calling for more aggressive scrutiny of mosques,
Muslim community organizations, and Muslim student groups. 30 This rhetoric
seeks to deputize Muslim religious leaders to spy on their congregations with
little regard for the broad, adverse implications on religious freedom for all
Americans.3 1
The article concludes by calling for smarter, more efficient policies that
focus on criminal activity rather than stereotypes that stigmatize entire
communities as suspicious and disloyal. To the extent that Muslims, Arabs,
and South Asians are the "miner's canary" 32 in forecasting the post-9/11 loss of
28. By the Southern Poverty Law Center's count, 149 "patriot militia groups" were
operating in the United States in 2008, but that number increased to 824 by 2010-a 500%
increase. John Avion, Georgia TerrorPlot's Militia Roots, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 3, 2011, 9:33
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/03/georgia-terror-plot-s-scary-roots-infar-right-fringe.html.
29. See Liaquat Ali Khan, The Essentialist Terrorist, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 47, 47
(2005) (describing the invention of the "essentialist terrorist" as a "Muslim militant ...
trained in religious schools . . . and recruited to unleash violence against the unbelievers").
30. See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, King, Lieberman Announce Joint House-Senate Hearing on Homegrown
Terror Threat to Military Communities-Hearing Scheduled for December 7 (Nov. 28,
2011), available at http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/king-lieberman-announce-jointhouse-senate-hearing-homegrown-terror-threat-military; Victor Manuel Ramos, LI Muslims
Uneasy About King Hearings, NEWSDAY (Feb. 21, 2011, 10:07 PM), http://www.
newsday.com/long-island/li-muslims-uneasy-about-king-hearings-1.2704094 (reporting how
Representative Peter King has repeatedly asserted that "80 percent of U.S. mosques are
controlled by radicals and could be harboring terrorists").
In his congressional hearings about homegrown terrorism committed by
31.
Muslims, Representative Peter King stated:
There has not been enough cooperation from the Muslim community .... That is
what I have learned over the past eight or nine years in dealing with lawenforcement officials at all levels. It has been disappointing. There is no doubt
that the overwhelming majority of Muslims are good people, but the leadership in
their communities has not cooperated enough, nor have they set a tone for
cooperation. I want to see that change.
Robert Costa, King's Speech, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Feb. 15, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/articles/259733/king-s-speech-robert-costa?pg=1.
32.
Race has been compared to a miner's canary:
Race, for us, is like the miner's canary. Miners often carried a canary into the
mine alongside them. The canary's more fragile respiratory system would cause it
to collapse from noxious gases long before humans were affected, thus alerting the
miners to danger .

..

. Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner's

canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens us all.
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civil rights and liberties for all Americans, their experiences demonstrate
America's downward progression from the Founding Fathers' vision of a
society where individuals can speak, assemble, and practice their faith free of
government intervention or persecution.
I. MISTAKING RELIGIOSITY FOR TERRORISM

First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak outBecause I was not a Socialist.
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak outBecause I was not a Trade Unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak outBecause I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me-and there was no one left to speak for me.
-Martin Niemiller, 1892-1984"
The current preventive paradigm for countering terrorism misguidedly uses
political beliefs and religious practices as proxies for criminal activity. 4
Orthodox Muslims or those who openly critique U.S. government policies find
themselves targeted by aggressive counterterrorism tactics. Not only does this
practice undermine civil liberties, it wastes limited law enforcement resources
by monitoring legal activity while ignoring unlawful activity committed by
those not fitting the religious profiles. Looking for evidence of radicalization
through an individual's clothing, facial hair, or religious observances diverts
resources from investigations of true threats. 35

LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY 11 (2002) (footnote omitted).
33.
Martin Niemdller: "First They Came for the Socialists . . . ," U.S. HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?Moduleld=10007392 (last

updated Jan. 6, 2011).
34. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 2, at 30-33 ("[I]nstead of incarcerating
people on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed a past infraction,
the preventive paradigm turns to detention as a preventive matter and employs it against
individuals deemed suspect by virtue of their group identity or political affiliations.");
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST:

THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 31 (2007), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/public/Site

Files/documents/NYPD Report-RadicalizationintheWest.pdf (asserting that "[w]earing
traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard," and "[b]ecoming involved in social activism
and community issues" are signs of "radicalization"); Michael Powell, In Police Training, a
Dark Film on U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/nyregion/in-police-training-a-dark-film-on-us-muslims.
html?pagewanted=all (reporting that the NYPD showed over 1400 of its officers a film titled
The Third Jihad, which accuses American Muslims of "deception" and waging jihad
"covertly throughout the West today").
35.

See, e.g., SILBER & BHArr, supra note 34, at 18.
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Furthermore, it is unlawful for the government to investigate and prosecute
individuals solely based on First Amendment protected speech, association,
assembly, and religious practices 36-and for good reason. Our Founding
Fathers were cognizant that when the government exercises its authority to
quash political opponents or dissenting views, our democracy is threatened.37
The Founding Fathers experienced first-hand the devastating effects of state
entanglement in religious affairs. When one religion is disfavored among
others, it results in a stigmatization and shunning of the religion's congregants
in the court of public opinion or, worse, in a court of law.38 Once the
government is permitted to persecute a particular group based on its protected
constitutional rights, it is only a matter of time before other groups are unfairly
targeted.3 9
A. Selective TargetingBased on Religious and PoliticalActivity

Prohibitions against racial profiling in law enforcement do not apply to
religious or ethnic origin profiling.40 Therefore, the government profiles on
account of religion and ethnic origin in counterterrorism enforcement with no
legal recourse for those targeted.4 1 Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV 2010); OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONs 13 (2008),
availableat http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (prohibiting the FBI from
"investigating or collecting or maintaining information on United States persons solely for
the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise
of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States"); see also OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S INVESTIGATIONS OF
CERTAIN DOMESTIC ADVOCACY GROUPS 7 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/
special/sl009r.pdf (reiterating the standard set forth in the U.S. Attorney General's 1989 and
2002 FBI guidelines).
37.
See, e.g., LARRY D. ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT HERITAGE: THE GROWTH OF FREE
SPEECH INEARLY AMERICA 142 (1994).
38.
Id. at 9, 13, 139-40.
39.
See, e.g., ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM 92-94 (1994)
(explaining how the damages of McCarthyism spread from Communist groups to left-led
unions, other liberal reform movements, and the nation's cultural and intellectual life).
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACIAL PROFILING (2003), available at http://www.

justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling fact sheet.pdf (outlining Justice Department
guidelines making clear that racial profiling is illegal). But see Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806 (1996) (permitting law enforcement to make pretextual stops so long as there is
probable cause of some violation of law, such as a traffic infraction, that would otherwise
justify the stop).
41.
See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: How U.S. GOVERNMENT
PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION'S DOORSTEP 4, 7, 10-12, 14, 23 (2009)
available at http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/Returning%2OHo
me.pdf, CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, PA. STATE UNiV. DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, FOR AM.-
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("FBI") diverts resources to "map" U.S. communities based on religious,
ethnic, and national-origin characteristics, identifying particular "ArabAmerican and Muslim communities" as "potential terrorist recruitment
ground[s]."42 The following cases demonstrate the problematic relationship
between counterterrorism enforcement and religious and political activity.
In 2003 the government accused Sami Al-Arian of being the leader of a
Palestinian jihadist group.43 To support its case, the government relied mainly
on evidence from the early 1990s when Al-Arian expressed strong political
views in support of Palestinian rights." The jury in the case, however,
acquitted Al-Arian on eight of the seventeen charges and refused to convict him
of the others.45 Foregoing a retrial, the prosecution agreed to a plea bargain
with Al-Arian in which he pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and "agreed to be
deported."A6 Although Al-Arian was scheduled for release in April of 2007,
immigration authorities imprisoned him for an additional year and a half for
"refusing to testify before a grand jury about a cluster of Muslim organizations
in northern Virginia."A7 The 9/11 attacks made prosecution of Muslim activists
like Al-Arian more politically palatable. Indeed, the detention of Al-Arian
raises questions as to whether his political beliefs were determinative in his
selection for prosecution.

COMM., NSEERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S EFFORTS
34, 38 (2009), available at http://www.adc.org/PDF/nseers
paper.pdf; Press Release, Muslim Advocates & Am. Civil Liberties Union, Groups Seek End
to Religious Questioning at the Border by Federal Agents (Dec. 16, 2010),
Press
http://www.muslimadvocates.org/FINAL DHS%20CBP%201etter/o20release.pdf;
Release, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. & Yale Law Sch., ICE Targets Immigrants
from Muslim Majority Countries Prior to 2004 Presidential Election (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://www.adc.org/PDF/frontline.pdf.
42.
Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Scrutinizedfor Amassing Data on American Communities,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/
aclu-releases-fbi-documents-on-american-communities.html?_r-1&hpw.
See Jennifer Steinhauer, Palestinian to Be Imprisoned Before Deportation,N.Y.
43.
TIMES (May 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/us/Olcnd-islamic.html?_r-1&
oref-slogin.
44. Id. (reporting that Al-Arian "had been under surveillance by American
intelligence officials since 1991"); Trial of Sami Al-Arian Concludes with Acquittals,
ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
TO SECURE ITS BORDERS

Deadlocks, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.adl.org/mainTerror

ism/arian deadlock 121305.htm.
See Steinhauer,supra note 43.
45.
46.

Sami Al-Arian Released After 5.5 Years in Prison, DEMOCRACYNOW.ORG (Sept.

3, 2008), http://www.democracynow.org/2008/9/3/samialarianreleasedafter-five.
47. Id. Following a successful habeas corpus petition, Al-Arian was eventually
released in September of 2008. Id.
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In another case, the FBI threatened Imam Foad Farahi with deportation for
refusing to serve as a government informant over his congregation.48 Farahi, an
Iranian national, had applied for political asylum out of fear from persecution
by the Shi-a dominated Iranian government on account of his adherence to
Sunni Islam.49 When Farabi informed the FBI that he could not "in good
conscience" cooperate with them by "spy[ing] on members of his mosque," but
would otherwise help so long as his relationship with the government was
public, the government placed him in deportation proceedings.so Imam Farahi
is only one of several imams who have faced deportation post-9/11 under
questionable circumstances.
In another high-profile case, the federal government held Syed Fahad
Hashmi, a U.S. citizen raised in Queens, New York, in isolation for three years
on allegations of providing material support to al Qaeda. 52 The government's
case relied primarily on testimony of cooperating witness Junaid Babar, an
acquaintance who stayed with Hashmi in London for two weeks in 2004.53
Allegedly, Hashmi allowed Babar to store "military gear," such as raincoats,
ponchos, and waterproof socks, in his London apartment-equipment Babar
later delivered to an al Qaeda member in Pakistan. 54 The government placed
Hasmi in pretrial solitary confinement based on these charges, political
statements he made at Brooklyn College in 2002 (reportedly calling America
"the biggest terrorist in the world"), and his membership in a New York-based
48. See Trevor Aaronson, FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to Be an
Informant, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-1008/news/unholy-war-fbi-tries-to-deport-north-miami-beach-imam-foad-farahi-for-refusing-to
-be-an-informant/.
49. Id.
50. Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 51,
availableat http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants.
51.
See, e.g., Imam Deportedfor Lying in Terror Probe, TULSA WORLD (July 6,
2010, 2:36 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=338&articleid=
20100706_13_A3_Iahaas95349&rss Ink=1 (reporting that an imam entangled in a New
York City subway bombing plot was deported to Saudi Arabia, despite his history of
cooperation with law enforcement, after pleading guilty to lying to the FBI); Imam Without a
Country, MSNBC.coM (Jan. 15, 2007, 5:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16638494/
ns/us news-security/ (reporting that the imam of Ohio's largest mosque was deported to the
West Bank amidst complaints of"double-cross[ing] by U.S. immigration officials"); cf Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471-72 (1892) (allowing an Anglican priest to
remain in the country by disregarding the letter of immigration law and characterizing the
United States as a "Christian nation" that prized religion).
52.
See Jeanne Theoharis, The Legal Black Hole in Lower Manhattan: The
Unfairness of the Trial of Muslim Activist Syed FahadHashmi, SLATE MAG. (Apr. 27, 2010,
11:05 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2252117/.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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political group, Al Muhajiroun.ss Al Muhajiroun is not a designated terrorist
organization, 56 but nevertheless Hashmi's First Amendment protected speech
and associations with the group were used against him.57 Despite his
proclamations of innocence, Hashmi accepted a plea bargain on the eve of trial
due in part to his concerns he could not get a jury untainted by the pervasive
stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists.58
In the fall of 2010, the FBI "searched six addresses in Minneapolis and two
in Chicago seeking . . . 'investigation into activities concerning the material

support of terrorism."' 59 The targets were 23 "anti-war activists" including
Hatem Abudayyeh, a respected Arab American with a demonstrated
commitment to civil and human rights.6 0 The FBI raided Abudayyeh's home
after he helped organize educational trips to the Palestinian territories in
support of a Palestinian state. Although formal charges have yet to be filed,
the government searched for evidence that Abudayyeh had unlawfully provided
money and other resources to designated terrorist organizations. 62 Allegedly,
the travelers gave money to a Palestinian women's group "linked" to a small
organization "on the U.S. list of terrorist groups."'63 Abudayyeh, meanwhile,
claimed that the money was paid for "accommodation, food and transportation"
at "no more than .. . [fifty dollars] per person a day during the two week

tours."6 One of the targeted activists stated that small sums she contributed to
Abudayyeh's efforts were raised, in part, through her daughter's lemonade
55.

Id.

56. Designated organizations may be Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed by the
Secretary of State, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2006), or Specially Designated Global Terrorists
listed by the Department of the Treasury, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006) (granting the President
the authority to designate Specially Designated Global Terrorists); Exec. Order No. 13,224,
3 C.F.R. 786 (2001) (extending presidential power under § 1702 to the Department of the
Treasury); see also Sahar F. Aziz, Note, The Laws on Providing Material Support to
Terrorist Organizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a Legitimate Tool for
Preventing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 45, 46 (2003).
57. See Theoharis, supra note 52.
58. See Larry Neumeister, SyedHashmi, American Student, Pleads Guilty to Helping
Al Qaida, HUFFINGTON POST (April 27, 2010, 8:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/04/27/syed-hashmi-american-stud_n 55421 1.html.
59. See, e.g., Searches, Grand Jury Investigation Target Anti-War Activists in
Chicago, Minneapolis, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.charityand
security.org/news/Searches FBIAntiWarActivists.
60. See Michael Tarm, Activist: Palestinian Trips Had No Link to Terror, SEATTLE
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/20141
57654 apusfbiraidsterrorism.html?syndication=rss.

61.

See id.

62.
63.
64.

See id.
See id.
Id.
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stand.65 This case corroborated concerns among Arabs and Muslims that
political viewpoints on Palestine are more determinative than criminal activity
in triggering a terrorism investigation.66
Additionally, thousands of individuals have been subjected to the FBI's
abuse of "voluntary" interviews over the past ten years.67 Many wellintentioned Muslims accept the FBI's requests to speak with them (often
without a lawyer) only to find themselves prosecuted for making false
statements on issues unrelated to terrorism.68 Others are coerced into serving
as informants under threat of prosecution for false statements.6 9 Indeed, the
problem has become so endemic that advocacy groups are proactively
educating these communities on their right to refuse to submit to voluntary
interviews and the importance of retaining counsel to protect them from this
common preventive tactic.7 0

65.

See id.

66. Preemptive Prosecution-Cheney's1% Approach to Justice, PROJECT SALAM,
http://www.projectsalam.org/downloads/Preemptive Prosecution CaseSummaries.pdf (last
visited Jan. 8, 2012) (highlighting the cases of Al-Arian, the Holy Land Foundation, and
others where the defendants had controversial views in support of Palestinian human rights).
67. See, e.g., Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist:The FBI Hunts for the Enemy
Within, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 37, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2011/
08/0083545 ("In November 2001, the Department of Justice began conducting 'voluntary
interviews' with 5,000 Middle Eastern noncitizens. Hundreds of FBI agents were dispatched
across the country to conduct the interviews, with standard questions like 'Are you aware of
anybody who reacted in a surprising way about the terrorist attacks?'); Mary Beth Sheridan,
Interviews of Muslims to Broaden: FBI Hopes to Avert a TerroristAttack, WASH. POST, July
17, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A560802004Jull6.html.
68. See, e.g., Nick Meyer, Prominent Attorney Who Refused to Betray Arab and
Muslim Clients Speaks on Civil Liberties, Life on Terror Watch List, ARAB-AM. NEWS (Aug.
21, 2011, 2:25 AM), http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&catCommunity&article=4627 ("[A]bout 1,200 non-citizens were rounded up immediately after
the 9/11 attacks and . . . the only charges brought against them were actually for routine
immigration violations or in some cases ordinary crimes .... ); Wajahat Ali, Time for FBI
to Stop Spying on American Muslims, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.

guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/07/islam-terrorism.
69. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 50, at 30, 32-33.
70. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS WHEN ENCOUNTERING
LAW ENFORCEMENT 4-5 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/kyr/kyrenglish.pdf;
Got Rights?, MUSLIM

ADVOCATES,

http://www.muslimadvocates.org/get

involved/got

rights.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); Know Your Rights, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC
RELATIONS

(2011),
http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/KnowYourRights.aspx#9;
Urgent
Community Alert: Seek Legal Advice Before Talking to FBI, MUSLIM ADVOCATES

1-2,
http://www.muslimadvocates.org/FBI IVUCOMMUNITY%20ALERT.pdf
visited Jan. 8, 2012).

(last
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When examined in context, these cases demonstrate a troubling trend in the
preventive counterterrorism model: selective enforcement against Muslims
based on orthodox religious practices or unpopular political viewpoints.
B. The Use ofInformants to Chill Religious Freedom and PoliticalActivity

The selective enforcement model relies heavily on dubious informants
hired as "mosque crawlers" in search of vulnerable young men fitting a
religious profile. For decades, informants have been an integral part of law
enforcement. However, their pervasive presence in post-9/1 1 counterterrorism
appears to be unprecedented. Compared to 1500 informants in 1975 and 2800
in 1980, reports indicate that there are now 15,000 FBI informants, whose tasks
are driven to a large extent by racial and religious profiling.71 According to
various news outlets, many of the informants are explicitly tasked to spy on and
infiltrate American Arab and Muslim communities.72 When coupling these
reports with recent discoveries that informants have induced Muslim men
toward violence, it should come as no surprise that Muslim communities are
73
distrustful of federal law enforcement agencies.
The abuse of informants is spreading to state and local law enforcement
agencies. The New York Police Department ("NYPD") was recently ordered
to release documents revealing that agents and informants had repeatedly
targeted New York City mosques, restaurants, and other Muslim-owned
businesses viewed as "security risks" for "endorsing conservative religious
views or having devout customers."74 In addition, the NYPD explicitly used
"ethnic orientation, leadership and group affiliations" to mark fifty-three

71.
The Informants: How the FBI's Massive Informant Network Actually Created
Most Plots "Foiled" in U.S. Since 9/11, OLDSPEAK J. (Oct. 11, 2011, 4:57 PM),
http://theoldspeakjoumal.wordpress.com/20 11/10/1 1/the-informants-how-the-fbis-massiveinformant-network-actually-created-most-terrorist-plots-foiled-in-u-s-since-9 11/.
72. Aaronson, supra note 50, at 32; Bloomberg Backs Law Enforcement Ahead of
Muslim Leaders' Breakfast Boycott, CNN (Dec. 29, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-1229/us/us new-york-bloomberg_I_muslim-leaders-spy-agency-cia?_s=PM:US;
FBI Used
Outreach Programmes 'to Spy on Muslims,' TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2011,

12:59 AM),

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/892993 I/FBI-used-outreachprogrammes-to-spy-on-Muslims.html.
73.
Aaronson, supra note 50, at 32, 35.
74. Documents Show NY Police Watched Devout Muslims, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6,
2011, 6:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/APfdla04fa820c44bd820aae6bc75d33e3.html;
see also Joe Coscarelli, NYPD Even Spied on the Muslim Leaders Who Were Helping Them,
N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2011/10/nypd even
spied_on_the muslim.html (reporting that an imam was the target of New York City Police
Department surveillance at the same time that he was welcoming officers into his mosque
and attending hearings with Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly).
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"mosques of concern."75 According to the Associated Press, the documents
"paint the clearest picture yet of how the past decade's hunt for terrorists also
put huge numbers of innocent people under scrutiny as they went about their
daily lives in mosques, restaurants and social groups." 76
Some of the informants, however, boast suspect or downright criminal
pasts. 77 A telling case study involves an informant paid by the FBI to fake his
conversion to Islam in order to infiltrate mosques and instigate terror plots
Ironically, the informant's
among the Los Angeles Muslim communities.
reported him to the
actually
Muslims
that
targeted
tactics were so aggressive
79
leaders, the
community
to
the
Unbeknownst
FBI as a potential terrorist.
suspected terrorist was in fact an informant tasked with creating a fake terrorist
plot.80 Discovery of his real identity, along with other informants across the
country, put into serious question the intentions of law enforcement in
counterterrorism operations. The Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities
reasonably suspected the government was more concerned with scoring
political points by bolstering terrorism statistics than protecting public safety.81
Indeed, many Muslim community groups accused the government of systemic
entrapment of vulnerable young men, citing to investigative reports by
mainstream media outlets. 82

75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
For example, in 2005, a British businessman was convicted of providing material
77.
support to terrorists after law enforcement officials-acting as both the buyer and sellerreportedly caught him "brokering the sale of a surface-to-air missile." See Bartosiewicz,
supra note 67. The informant involved in this sting operation had previously incriminated
an innocent man during a DEA drug sting. Id. In an alleged 2007 plot involving destruction
of fuel tanks at John F. Kennedy International Airport, the informant was a former drug
dealer busted for possessing $2 million in cocaine and conspiring to murder a rival dealer.
Id.
78. See, e.g., Shan Li, FBI Violated 1st Amendment Rights of Muslims, Suit Alleges,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-fbi-muslims-2011
0224,0,2886967.story; Markon, supra note 17.
79. Markon, supra note 17 ("Muslims were so alarmed by [an informant's] talk of
violent jihad that they obtained a restraining order against him.").
80. Id.
81.
See, e.g., David Bario, By Any Means Necessary, AM. LAW. (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=l 196279828736 (stating that the federal
government's 2003 guidelines for prosecuting terrorism "encouraged strategic overinclusiveness in charging terrorism suspects," causing prosecutors to "throw the kitchen sink
at suspects to get them off the streets before they could act").
82. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 50; Malia Wollan & Charlie Savage, Holder
Calls Terrorism Sting Operations 'Essential,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A34, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/us/politics/12holder-1.html?scp=1&sq=Holder/o20
Calls%20Terrorism%20Sting%200perations%20'Essential'&st-cse (reporting that Muslim
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Likewise, in a case sensationally coined "the Albany missile plot," the FBI
targeted two Muslims at a local mosque using a paid informant. The targets,
Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain, were "well-known members of the
[local] community ...

with no prior criminal record and no history of

violence." 84 The FBI's investigation began shortly after 9/11, when one of the
mosque's founders was seen "celebrating the 9/11 attacks in the streets."85
That individual was never charged with a crime and was eventually deported.
However, surveillance of the mosque continued, culminating in an eight-month
sting operation. In that operation, government informant Shahed Hussain led
a fictitious money-laundering plot involving the sale of a shoulder-fired missile
provided by the FBI. Shahed Hussain was the same informant used in the
Newburgh Four case-another sting operation where the government's
informant played a problematic leading role in a fake terrorist plot.89
After befriending Mohammed Hossain, apparently to induce him into the
plot, the informant offered him a loan for his struggling pizzeria. 90 The
informant disclosed to Hossain that the loan had come from the sale of a
missile to a terrorist group. 9' As soon as Hossain accepted the loan and asked
Aref to witness it, they were both arrested on charges of conspiring to aid a
terrorist group, providing support for a weapon of mass destruction, moneylaundering, and supporting a foreign terrorist organization.92
A federal court in Albany sentenced the two defendants to fifteen years in
federal prison after they pleaded guilty, and the case "became one of the
leaders criticized the FBI's practices as "sting operations amount[ing] to improper
entrapment").
83. See Bartosiewicz, supra note 67.
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88.
Paul Grondahl, Suspicion, Acceptance in Wake of Terror Trial, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Oct. 12, 2006, at B1, available at http://albarchive.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.
wm.request?oneimage&imageid=6362940.
89.
CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 22 & 64 n.143.
90. Ted Conover, The Pathetic Newburgh Four, SLATE MAG. (Nov. 23, 2010, 12:21
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/jurisprudence/2010/l l/thepathetic
newburgh four.html (reporting allegations that Hussain offered $250,000, a BMW, and
other encouragement to induce the Newburgh Four-one of which suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia and two of which had histories of drug offenses and minimum-wage jobs, but
not anti-American sentiment-to pursue terrorist acts); Anjali Kamat & Jacquie Soohen,
Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI's Reliance on PaidInformants Raises Questions About
Validity of Terrorism Cases, DEMOCRACYNOw.ORG (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.democracy
now.org/2010/10/6/entrapment-or-foilingterrorfbis-reliance.
91.
Kamat & Soohen, supra note 90.
92.
Id.
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government's most lauded victories in the fight against domestic terrorismeven though, by the government's own acknowledgment, it involved no
terrorists, no terrorism plot, and a missile provided by the FBI." 93 Yassin Aref
is now held at one of two Communications Management Units"experimental" prison facilities notorious for harsh and restrictive treatment
that hold disproportionate numbers of Muslim inmates. 94
In the case of Rezwan Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen accused of plotting to fly
explosive-filled miniature airplanes into the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon,
there is reason to doubt whether the suspect was capable of devising such a
complicated plot without the help of the government informant.9 5 According to
the affidavit filed with Ferdaus's indictment, significant questions remain
regarding how Ferdaus actually came to the attention of the FBI and whether
Ferdaus had the means to travel to Washington, D.C. on a "scouting trip" and
purchase a miniature airplane without the thousands of dollars in cash the
informants provided.96 Further, the fact that "undercover agents met with
Ferdaus and questioned the 'feasibility' of his plan" suggests that "the FBI
agents were .. . goading Ferdaus into more action." 97
And in Iowa, members of the small Muslim community in Des Moines
were surprised to learn that Arvinder Singh, an Indian-born Sikh, was sent into
their mosques to spy for the FBI. 98 Singh stated that he felt "obliged" to obey
the FBI after he was charged with selling more than the legal limit of Sudafed,
an offense that Singh claims he committed unwittingly. 99 Bit the FBI promised
to expunge the offense from Singh's record and help him acquire American
citizenship-an offer that Singh "desperately wanted."100 The FBI reportedly
told Singh, "You look Middle Eastern, and we need your help for the war
against terror." 01 After assuming a Muslim identity, Singh frequented
mosques throughout Iowa but attended four mosques regularly for seven years,
93. Bartosiewicz, supra at 67.
94. See Alia Malek, Gitmo in the Heartland,NATION, Mar. 28, 2011, at 17, 17-18,
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/159161/gitmo-heartland. See infra Part I.C
for a detailed discussion of Communications Management Units and their disproportionate
use against Muslim inmates.
95. Paul Harris, FBI Faces Entrapment Questions over Rezwan Ferdaus Bomb Plot
Arrest, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/29/
fbi-entrapment-rezwan-ferdaus?newsfeed=true.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Kiran Khalid, Iowa Muslim Leader: Law Enforcement Betrayed Us, CNN (Feb.
3, 2012, 8:48 PM), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/03/iowa-muslim-leader-lawenforcement-betrayed-us/.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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occasionally taping conversations with congregants.1o2 Yet despite the FBI's
promise and his cooperation, Singh was arrested and placed into deportation
proceedings when he tried to apply for citizenship.'0 3
In November 2011, the FBI effectively admitted to the misuse of
informants by the NYPD.'
The NYPD had paid an informant to train and
lead Muslim convert Joseph Pimentel, a drug user with possible mental illness,
to attempt a terrorist plot.'0 5 Absent the informant's infusion of funds and
expertise, Pimentel had no money, no knowledge of how to create a bomb, and
arguably little inclination to follow through on violent acts.1 0 6 By declining to
get involved in the investigation because agents "were concem[ed] that the
informer might have played too active a role in helping Mr. Pimentel,"10 7 the
FBI confirmed one of American Muslim communities' worst fears.'
Law
enforcement agencies are so desperate to show they are effectively countering
terrorism that they poach on vulnerable Muslim targets.' 09
Skeptics of these entrapment allegations may interpret the FBI's decision
not to participate in the Pimentel case as evidence that the FBI does not, in fact,
engage in entrapment. However, when coupled with the aforementioned cases
and others," 0 the Pimentel case offers compelling evidence that the misuse of
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum & Joseph Goldstein, Informer's Role in Terror
Case Is Said to Have DeterredF.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at Al, availableat http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/nyregion/for-jose-pimentel-bomb-plot-suspect-an-online-trail
.html?pagewanted=1&_r-1 ("But it was the informer's role, and that of his police handlers,
that have now been cited as among the reasons the F.B.I., which had its own parallel
investigation of Mr. Pimentel, did not pursue the case ....
105. Id
106. Id. ("The suspect had little money to speak of, was unable to pay his cellphone
bill and scrounged for money to buy the drill bits that court papers said he required to make
his pipe bombs. Initially, he had trouble drilling the small holes that needed to be made in
the metal tubes.").
107. Id.
108.

MUSLIM ADVOCATES, LOSING LIBERTY: THE STATE OF FREEDOM 10 YEARS AFTER

THE PATRIOT ACT 1, 4, 12 (2011), available at http://www.muslimadvocates.org/Losing
LibertyThe Stateof Freedom 10 Years AfterthePATRIOTAct.pdf; MPAC Sends
Letter to FBI over Use of Informants, MUSLIM PUB. AFFAIRS COUNCIL (May 26, 2009),
http://disqus.com/forums/mpac/mpacsendslettertofbidirector overuseof informants
muslimpublic affairs council_34/trackback/.
109. See also Kristin Wright, Family of Plot Suspect Says He Is Innocent,
MYFOXTAMPABAY.COM

(Jan. 9, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://www.myfoxtampabay.com/dpp/

news/local/hillsborough/family-of-plot-suspect-says-he-is-innocent-01092012 (reporting on
statements by the family of terror suspect Sami Osmakac that he could not have had the
amount of cash he was suspected of providing to an FBI informant in order to purchase the
supposed weapons).
110. See CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 18.
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informants is a real problem in counterterrorism-notwithstanding denials by
the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. I
Acknowledging that law enforcement may be overreaching in
counterterrorism operations is important for many reasons. First, it is a
prerequisite for a constructive discussion on how best to use limited resources
to effectively prevent terrorism. Wasting money and time by hiring dubious
individuals to create and execute terror plots makes the country less safe as real
terrorists proceed undetected. Second, overzealous informants corroborate the
suspicion that counterterrorism is more about creating scapegoats than making
the country safer. This has devastating effects on relations between the
government and Muslim communities, as well as individual rights. Third, such
tactics perpetuate unfounded conspiracy theories percolating in the public
discourse that all Muslims are disloyal, thereby justifying collective suspicion
and punishment of Muslims by private actors as well as the government.
Finally, there is a serious rule of law issue at stake. Law enforcement
holds almost unfettered discretion to choose whom to target and how to execute
the investigation and prosecution. Abuse of such discretion leads to a general
distrust in government and a corruption of the American legal system. When
citizens suspect law enforcement of scapegoating particular racial or religious
groups to satisfy public anxieties, they lose faith in the American promise of
equal protection before the law. Once the system is corrupted, all Americans
suffer, as it is only a matter of time before abuse of discretion becomes a new
norm used against other vulnerable communities.1 2
C. The Pitfalls ofReligious Profiling

Focusing on religiosity and ethnic origin wastes government resources
when only a small portion of investigations result in criminal charges." 3 It also
diverts resources away from persons who do not fit the post-9/1 1 profile of a
Muslim terrorist.l14 As shown by recent attempted plots, bona fide terrorists

111. FBI Director Questioned About Muslim Relations, INFocus NEWS (Mar. 31,
2009), http://www.infocusnews.net/content/view/33149/135/ (reporting on FBI Director
Robert Mueller's denials of allegations that his agency systemically spies on mosques).
112. See Attorney General's Guidelines: Detecting and Preventing TerroristAttacks,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/53002factsheet.htm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (using neutrality principles to justify more targeted FBI
investigations of "radical" religious and political organizations).
113. See Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Focusing on Security over Ordinary Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/us/24fbi.
html? r-3; Searches, Grand Jury Investigation Target Anti-War Activists in Chicago,
Minneapolis,supra note 59.
114. See, e.g., CHARLES KuRZMAN, DEP'T OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIV. OF N.C., CHAPEL
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often operate covertly with no connections to established institutions, such as
mosques or other religious institutions."' 5 There is little evidence to suggest
that such individuals operate overtly through protests, public campaigns, or
other lawful means for seeking social change. Hence, when law enforcement
directs its resources toward groups and individuals openly expressing their
political dissent, true terrorists-whether Muslim or not-proceed with their
plans undetected."16
Evidence of the failure of counterterrorism strategies is ample. Notably,
the government has failed to prevent some of the most serious terrorist plots
attempted over the past few years. For instance, but for a fortuitous technical
failure and the rapid response of a bystander, thousands of people could have
been killed in Times Square in 2010.' 17 Similarly, the 2009 Nigerian Christmas
day bomber would have successfully killed hundreds on an airplane headed for
Detroit but for the failure of his bomb to ignite." 8 Despite the massive

HILL, MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: AN ACCOUNTING 3 (2011), available at

http://sanford.duke.edu/centers/tcths/about/documents/Kurzman Muslim-AmericanTerror
ism Since 911 An Accounting.pdf ("There were . . . more than 20 terrorist plots by nonMuslims in the United States in 2010, including attacks by Joseph Stack, who flew a plane
into an IRS building in Austin, Texas; Larry Eugene North, who is suspected of placing
bombs in mailboxes across eastern Texas; and George Jakubec, who was accused of
manufacturing explosives in his home in Escondido, California."); see also David Crary,
Post-9/11 Tradeoff Security vs. Civil Liberties, Hous. CHRON. (Nov. 22, 2011, 12:29 PM),
http://www.chron.com/news/article/Post-9-1 1-tradeoff-Security-vs-civil-liberties-2277843.
php#page-4 (comparing today's racial mapping programs with COINTELPRO and
McCarthyism, and citing former FBI agent Michael German as saying that "[t]argeting entire
communities for investigation based on erroneous stereotypes produces flawed
intelligence").
115. See infra note 140 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent terrorist
plots.
116. Throughout this country's history, dissidents have generally fallen into two nonoverlapping groups: open political critics, who rarely engaged in terrorism, and violent
opponents, who operated in the shadows and avoided even peaceful dissidents of the same
stripe. See infra text accompanying notes 120-127 (discussing recent attacks by terrorists
who do not fit the "Muslim terrorist" profile). Therefore, the FBI is following a strategy of
well-proven uselessness. At most, it will find (and likely entrap) some hotheads. Yet those
who intend serious harm to the United States, and likely would have avoided peaceful
religious and political organizations even prior to the surveillance, certainly will do so now.
117. See Steve Benen, Meet Aliou Niasse, WASH. MONTHLY (May 5, 2010, 11:30
AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_05/023656.php.
118. See, e.g., Andrew Johnson & Emily Dugan, Wealthy, Quiet, Unassuming: The
Christmas Day Bomb Suspect, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 27, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/wealthy-quiet-unassuming-the-christmas-day-bomb-suspect-1851090.
html (reporting that when a suspect's father informed the U.S. embassy in Nigeria of his
son's activities, the official briefing the case confirmed that the United States had known of
the suspect's terrorist ties for at least two years prior to the attempted attack).
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intelligence infrastructure created post-9/1 1, the intelligence community failed
to act on his father's warnings to the U.S. embassy in Nigeria, as well as other
relevant intelligence.1 19
Meanwhile, terrorists who do not fit the "Muslim terrorist" profile are
fortuitously stopped or in some cases tragically missed. White supremacist
James Cummings, for example, was actively constructing a lethal dirty bomb
undetected by the FBI.120 Only after his wife shot him in self-defense did the
government discover his terrorist plot.1 2 1 Similarly, Joseph Stack flew an
airplane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas in protest of the IRS's demands
that he pay his taxes.122 Stack's terrorist attack killed an IRS employee who
was a military veteran.123 Had the attack occurred at a different time of day,
however, hundreds of IRS employees could have been killed. Donny Eugene
Mower threw a Molotov cocktail into a Planned Parenthood clinic in
California, causing $26,000 of damage.124 That he did not injure or kill anyone
was only because he acted "in the early morning hours."1 25 Another white
supremacist was charged with murdering a security guard at the Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., and an anti-abortion extremist was
convicted of murdering abortion-provider George Tiller in his church in
Wichita, Kansas.126 Finally, in Tucson, Arizona, Jared Loughner shot and
killed six people while wounding fourteen others, including Congresswoman
Gabrielle Giffords. 127
119. Id.
120. See Walter Griffin, Report: 'Dirty Bomb' Parts Found in Slain Man's Home,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009, 10:22 PM), http://new.bangordailynews.com/2009/
02/1 0/politics/report-dirty-bomb-parts-found-in-slain-mans-home/.
121. Id
122. See, e.g., Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane into Texas I.R.S. Office, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19
crash.html.
123. See Joan Walsh, Why so Little Attention to Vernon Hunter?, SALON.COM (Feb.
22, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.salon.com/2010/02/23/vernon hunter/ (reporting that
Joseph Stack's victim was a Vietnam veteran and IRS employee).
124. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty to
Civil Rights Violations in Connection with Arson at Planned Parenthood and Vandalism of
Mosque in Madera, California (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/October/
11-crt-1336.html.
125. Id.
126. Andrea Stone, Counterterrorism Czar Resists Muslim Labels, as Critics Say
Right- Wing Threat Looms Larger, HUFFINGTON PosT (Nov. 17, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/17/dhs-counterterrorism-muslimsn_1099631 .html?page=2.
127. See David A. Fahrenthold & Clarence Williams, Tucson Shooting Suspect Jared
Loughner Appears to Have Posted Bizarre Messages, WASH. POsT (Jan. 9, 2011, 12:24 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/08/AR2011010803961.
html (reporting that Loughner "left a trail of bizarre and anti-government messages on the
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Despite these incidents, the United States Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") shortsightedly focuses almost exclusively on domestic
Muslim groups.' 28 Yet in 2009 DHS issued an internal intelligence report
entitled "Rightwing Extremism," warning of rising terrorism by right-wing
domestic groups.129 The backlash to the report was remarkable: more than a
dozen organizations representing the political right called for the immediate
removal of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, prompting her to apologize for the
report, dismember the analytical unit that produced the report, and block the
distribution of definitions for terms such as "white supremacist" and "Christian
Identity" from its analytical digest.130 This occurred despite the well-

Internet"); Jessica Hopper et al., Accused Tucson Shooter JaredLoughner Smirks in Court,
Smiles for Mug Shot, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/jared-loughneralleged-tucson-shooting-gunman-appears-court/story?id=12580344#.T1UmgcyRn2c.
128. The Washington Post reported as follows:
The threat of Islamic-related terrorism in the United States has by all accounts
captured the most attention and resources at DHS since it was formed in 2002. But
a study conducted for the department last October concluded that a majority of the
86 major foiled and executed terrorist plots in the United States from 1999 to 2009
were unrelated to al-Qaeda and allied movements.
R. Jeffrey Smith, Homeland Security Department Curtails Home-Grown Terror Analysis,
WASH. POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/homeland-securitydepartment-curtails-home-grown-terror-analysis/2011/06/02/AGQEaDLHstory.html.
129. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PUB. No.
IA-0257-09, (U//FOUO) RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at

http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf; see also Audrey Hudson & Eli Lake, Napolitano
Stands by Controversial Report, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2009/apr/16/napolitano-stands-rightwing-extremism/?page=all.
130. See, e.g., Don Feder, Ad Demands DHS Secretary Napolitano's Removal and
Apology from Obama, CHRISTIAN NEWSWIRE (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.christiannews
wire.com/news/7232710188.html (reporting that a coalition of organizations, including the
American Family Association, the Religious Freedom Coalition, Let Freedom Ring, the
United States Justice Foundation, and Vision America, commissioned a full-page
advertisement in the Washington Times demanding the removal of Secretary Napolitano);
Jackie Kucinich, Napolitano Atones for DHS Report, ROLL CALL (May 7, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54 127/-34696-1.html; Caitlin Taylor, Conservatives Decry
Homeland Security Report on "Rightwing" Extremism, ABC NEwS (Apr. 15, 2009, 9:45
AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/04/conservatives-d/; Smith, supra note 128;
SPLC Urges DHS to Reassess Resources After Key Analyst Reveals Unit on Domestic Terror
Was Scaled Back in Wake of Right- Wing Criticism, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (June 6, 2011),
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc-urges-dhs-to-reassess-resources-after-keyanalyst-reveals-unit-on-domestic-terror-was-scaled-back; Bob Unruh, Campaign Demands
Boot for Napolitano: Nearly 2 Dozen Groups Appalled at "Extremism" Report, WND.COM
(Apr. 28, 2009, 9:15 PM), http://www.wnd.com/?pageld=96406. But see Anthony Kimery,
DHS Disputes Claims It Stopped Producing Intel Reports on Rightwing Extremists,
HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY (June 6, 2011, 8:44 AM), http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/
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documented evidence
of right-wing groups using or attempting to use
weapons of mass destruction.132 For example, the Washington Post reported
several cases of similar right-wing extremism in 2010:
Authorities ... have arrested neo-Nazis who allegedly planted a bomb
along the route of a Martin Luther King parade in Spokane, Wash.;
arrested six members of an Alaska militia who allegedly plotted to kill
state troopers; arrested a Wisconsin man for planning to kill Planned
Parenthood workers; and on May 29 arrested a Florida man who claimed
to be part of the burgeoning "sovereign citizen movement" after he
sprayed a market with AK-47 fire.'"
In light of these incidents, one DHS official explained the following frustration:
"Other reports written by DHS about Muslim extremists ... [get] through
without any major problems.... Ours went through endless reviews and edits,
and nothing came out."l 34 This inconsistency is partly due to the common
perception that only violence committed by Muslims is terrorism and thus
deserving of harsher treatment, while violence committed by (typically white)
right-wing extremists is negligible crime. 3 5
The preventive paradigm thus permits the government to expand its
investigative purview to focus almost exclusively on potential threats, more
often colored by religious and cultural associations than actual evidence.136 As
a result, many non-Muslim domestic terrorists commit violence undetected. 37
daily-news-briefings/single-article/dhs-disputes-claims-it-stopped-producing-intel-reports-on
-rightwing-extremists/32e45cd0bd2dc9c6f222afe8celc7a43.html.
131. See INTELLIGENCE PROJECT, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., TERROR FROM THE RIGHT
(2009), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror
from the right_0.pdf; Extremism in America, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://www.
adl.org/learn/ext-us/default.asp?LEARN Cat-Extremism&LEARNSubCat-Extremism-in
America (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
132. The criminal code defines a "weapon of mass destruction" as "any weapon that is
designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release,
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors"; "any weapon
involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector"; or "any weapon that is designed to release
radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life." 18 U.S.C. § 2332A(c)(2)(B)(D) (2006).
133. Smith, supra note 128.
134. Id. (first omission in original).
135. See Charles Ellison, Giffords' Shooting: Why Aren't We Calling It Terrorism?,
POLITIC365.COM (Jan. 10, 2011), http://politic365.com/201 1/01/10/giffords-shooting-whyarent-we-calling-it-terrorism/.
136. See Smith, supra note 128.
137.

See ALEJANDRO J. BEUTEL, MUSLIM PUB. AFFAIRS COUNCIL, DATA ON POST-9/11

TERRORISM rN THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.civilfreedoms.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/Post-9 11 -Terrorism-Data.pdf.
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Counterterrorism has become so politicized that actively pursuing Muslims
appears to be the most politically palatable strategy to justify the costly
preventive paradigm. Accordingly, the FBI has been more focused on
searching for terrorist threats at the expense of investigating ordinary crime.' 38
Devoting such considerable resources to investigations driven by racial and
religious profiles is entirely inefficient, as is the FBI's overbroad authority to
open threat assessments based solely on a "vague tip or some other ambiguous
lead." 3 1
Certainly, illegal activity can and does occur under the guise of legitimate
institutions and advocacy. But in the case of terrorism committed by Muslims
since 9/11, individuals often acted in secret, on their own, and without
involvement from a mosque or established American Muslim organization.1 40
Unfortunately, instead of reassessing the counterterrorism strategy that failed to
detect the Christmas day bomber, the Times Square bomber, and Major Nidal
Hasan's killing spree in Fort Hood, Texas,141 the government has targeted
mosques, community businesses, and Muslim charitable institutions.
D. Post-ConvictionProfiling-CommunicationsManagement Units

The disparate treatment produced by the preventive paradigm does not
cease following conviction. In cases where Muslims are convicted of terrorism
charges, the punishments are often extraordinarily severe compared to those
imposed on others convicted of similar acts. The only apparent distinction
among these cases is the religious and racial backgrounds of the defendants.142
138. See Savage, supra note 113 (reporting that, in recent years, FBI agents "have
been more likely to be hunting for potential threats to national security than for ordinary
criminals").
139. See Emily Berman, FBI: Fact or Fiction, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2-5 (July 27,
2011),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/59810135f03ecb3ac3_zhm6bxtbf.pdf
(analyzing
the
expanded authorities granted to the FBI through the use of threat assessments); Savage,
supra note 113.
140. See, e.g., Investigators Say FortHood Suspect Acted Alone, MSNBC.coM (Nov.
9, 2009, 9:33 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33777070/ns/us-news-tragedy_at_fort
hood/; see also supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
141. In November 2009, United States Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan wounded
twenty-nine and killed thirteen during a shooting spree in Fort Hood, Texas. Shortly after
the shooting, the "FBI launched an internal review of how it handled information gathered
about [Hassan] nearly a year [earlier]." See Investigators Say Fort Hood Suspect Acted
Alone, supra note 140.
142. Compare James C. McKinley Jr., Texas: Capital TrialIs Suggested in Rampage
at Fort Hood,N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 2011, at A16, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/05/us/05brfs-CAPITALTRIALBRF.html?src-twrhp (reporting that Major Nidal Malik
Hasan was to be recommended for court-martial and possible death penalty), with William
Yardley, Suspect Charged in Attempted MLK Day Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at
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The Bureau of Prisons currently houses Muslim terrorist suspects in
Communications Management Units ("CMUs")-facilities designed to restrict
inmate communications. 14 3 These units impose serious psychological and
emotional isolation for prisoners.144 Prisoners of CMUs have virtually no
contact with the outside world and are severely restricted in their
communications with friends or family. For example, inmate visitations in
CMUs are limited to eight hours per month with no physical contact;
maximum-security prisons, however, allow inmates up to thirty-five hours per
month. 145 Further, while even maximum-security prisons allow for "limited
physical contact, such as handshaking, embracing, and kissing, between an
inmate and a visitor," CMUs ban all physical contact.146
All visitor
conversations in CMUs must be in English unless special permission is granted
in advance.147 Further, CMU prisoners are permitted only two fifteen-minute
phone calls per week in contrast to the general prison population's right to 300

A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/us/l0bomb.html (reporting that a
suspect of an attempted bombing at a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day parade was "charged with
attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and possession of an unregistered explosive
device," but no terrorism charges).
143. See, e.g., Malek, supra note 94, at 17 (reporting that eighteen of the thirty-three
prisoners at the Terre Haute, Indiana CMU and twenty-three of thirty-six prisoners at the
Marion, Illinois CMU are Muslim, while Muslims make up just six percent of the overall
federal prison population). Unfortunately, such disparity in treatment across racial and
religious lines is not new to the American criminal justice system. It is similar to what we
witnessed in the draconian "War on Drugs," where as of the fall of 2010, African American
defendants received sentences nearly 100 times longer than their white counter-parts.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER,

THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION

IN THE AGE OF

COLORBLINDNESS 109-12 (2010) (discussing disparate sentencing requirements, namely, the
100:1 ratio of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine, and the fact that ninety-three percent of
those charged with crimes involving crack cocaine are African American). In August 2010,
President Barak Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which changed the crack-cocaine
sentencing disparity changed from 100:1 to 18:1, thereby decreasing but not eliminating the
consequent racial disparities. Danielle Kurtzleben, Data Show Racial Disparity in Crack
Sentencing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/news/

articles/2010/08/03/data-show-racial-disparity-in-crack-sentencing. But see Obama Signs
Bill Reducing Cocaine Sentence Gap, CBS NEWS (Aug. 3, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://

www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/03/politics/main6739503.shtml

(noting that the Fair

Sentencing Act does not affect state mandatory sentencing laws, where most drug offenses
are tried).
144. Complaint at Exhibit B, Aref v. Holder, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011) (No.
10-0539 (RMU)).
145. Id. at 14-15, 18-19.
146. 28 C.F.R. § 540.51(h)(2) (2011); Complaint, supra note 144, at 14-15.
147. Complaint, supra note 144.
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minutes of phone time per month.148 Worse, these exceptional conditions
continue with little public transparency and opportunity for challenging the
government's basis for such severe post-conviction punishments.149
Two CMUs currently exist: one in Terre Haute, Indiana and the other in
Marion, Illinois. 50 The facilities were opened in 2006 and 2008, respectively,
with limited adherence to legal procedures that would otherwise allow for
transparency and public scrutiny. '5 In 2006, in accordance with the
Administrative Procedures Act, the Bureau of Prisons published a proposed
rule to restrict communications by inmates with "an identifiable link to
terrorist-related activity."l52 During the comment period, the rule was
criticized by civil rights groups not only as unnecessary, but also as "flawed
Rather than consider the public comments
and potentially unconstitutional. "
and promulgate a final rule as legally required, the Bureau bypassed the rulemaking process altogether, opening a prison unit operating under the proposed
rule in December 2006.154 Sixteen men, including thirteen Arab Muslims and
one non-Arab Muslim, were placed in the unit and told they were part of "an
experiment."'ss

148. Id. at 20-21; Carrie Johnson & Margot Williams, 'GuantanamoNorth': Inside
Secretive U.S. Prisons, NPR (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/
guantanamo-north-inside-u-s-secretive-prisons.
149. See Karin Friedemann, Imam Yassin Aref Transferredfrom CMU, MUSLIM
OBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2011), http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=8312 (reporting the
opinion of one inmate who likened the inside of a CMU to a concealed condition of slavery);
Malek, supra 94 (describing how one prisoner was simply "told he was moving, given thirty
minutes to pack and thrown into 'the hole' until he was" transferred to the CMU); Carrie
Johnson & Margot Williams, Judge Allows Suit over Restrictions on Inmates to Go
Forward,NPR (Mar. 30, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/03/
30/134984393/judge-allows-suit-over-restrictions-on-inmates-to-go-forward (reporting the
lack of due process and oversight in CMUs).
150. Communications Management Units: The Federal Prison System's Experiment
in Social Isolation, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 1, http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/
CCRCMUFactsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
151. Malek, supra note 94, at 17.
152. Limited Communication for Terrorist Inmates, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,520, 16,523
(proposed Apr. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 540.200(b)(2)); see also Malek, supra
note 94, at 17. The proposed rule defined a "terrorist-related activity" in part as a violent or
dangerous criminal act apparently intended to intimidate, coerce, or cause mass destruction.
Limited Communication for Terrorist Inmates, 71 Fed. Reg. at 16,523 (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 540.201(a)).
153. Malek, supra note 94, at 17.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 18.
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Conditions are so egregious at CMUs that the Center for Constitutional
Rights has challenged their legality on constitutional grounds.156 The suit
alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons violated the plaintiffs' First, Fifth,
and Eighth Amendment rights by "creating, participating in, and endorsing
[p]laintiffs' systematic mistreatment."1 57 Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that
they were confined to the CMUs on account of their religious or political
beliefs, "or in retaliation for other protected First Amendment activity."' 58
Three of the seven plaintiffs are practicing Muslims.' 59 The complaint also
alleges that nearly "two-thirds of the prisoners confined . . . [in the CMUs] are

Muslim-a figure that over-represents the proportion of Muslim prisoners in
BOP [Bureau of Prisons] facilities by at least 1000%."l160 This calls into
question the propriety of the criteria for selecting which prisoners are placed
into CMUs. On April 6, 2010, the Bureau of Prisons reintroduced its proposed
rule, seeking to make the CMUs permanent fixtures of the American prison
system' 6-a
procedure
that should have been completed before the CMUs
16 2

were ever opened.

E. Flawed Community Outreach Models Aimed at Diffusing Legitimate
Grievances and Collecting Intelligence About Muslims

Muslim leaders have communicated many of the concerns highlighted in
this paper to government officials on multiple occasions and in various forums.
Indeed, specific offices within the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the
Department of Homeland Security are tasked with conducting outreach to
Muslim communities. 163 In theory, these programs are aimed at building

156. See Complaint, supranote 144, at 4-5.
157. Id. at 3, 5.
158.

Id. at 4.

159. Id. at 6-9.
160. Id. at 3-4.
161. Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,324 (proposed Apr. 6,
2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 540).
162. Will Potter, Government Acknowledges Secretive Prisons for "Domestic
Terrorists," Proposes Making Them Permanent,GREENISTHENEWRED.COM (Apr. 14, 2010),

http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/cmu-proposal-domestic-guantanamo/2660/.
163. See, e.g., About the Community Engagement Section, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1282160309298.shtm(last modified July 21,
2011); EnhancedEngagement with Arab and Muslim American Communities, FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/news-and-outreach/outreach/enhancedengagement-with-arab-and-muslim-american-communities (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) ("This
initiative brings together leaders from the Somali-American community to discuss with the
FBI issues important to their community. The group helps build relationships based on
mutual respect and understanding."); Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory
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constructive relationships between Muslim communities and law
enforcement.6 In practice, however, the community outreach programs are
superficial attempts to diffuse grievances arising from religious profiling,
abusive use of informants, and the chilling of religious and political activity.
To no avail, members of targeted communities repeatedly express concern
that outreach meetings are a politically divisive tactic, at best, and a calculated
means of entrapment, at worst.' 65 The grievances are routinely dismissed with
boilerplate responses that the American government does not counter terrorism
in violation of constitutional rights.166 Rather than reform government
Backlash: Enforcement and Outreach, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/
legalinfo/discrimupdate.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) ("Since September 11, 2001, the Civil
Rights Division has engaged in an extensive program of outreach to Muslim, Sikh, Arab, and
South-Asian American organizations. This outreach has included meetings of senior Civil
Rights Division officials with community leaders to address backlash-related civil rights
issues ..... .
164. See, e.g., NAT'L SEC. STAFF, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.,
STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT
EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., EMPOWERING
LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES, (2011), available

at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering localpartners.pdf
165. See, e.g., Letter from Salam Al-Marayati, President, Muslim Pub. Affairs
Council, to Senator Joseph Lieberman (June 16, 2010), available at http://files.e2ma.net/2
785/assets/docs/letter to senatorlieberman on islamist terminologympac 6-16-10_.pdf
(expressing concern over the use of religious terminology in counterterrorism efforts); Letter
from Twenty-Seven Orgs. to Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 8, 2010),
available at http://saalt.org/attachments/1/TSA%20Profiling%20Letter.pdf (objecting to
TSA's screening standards); Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and Broad
Coalition Tell Rep. King of Concerns About Muslim "Radicalization" Hearing (Mar. 8,
2011), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-national-security/aclu-and-broad-coalition-tell-repking-concerns-about-muslim-radicaliz (expressing concern about congressional hearings on
the alleged "radicalization" of American Muslims and "the unsubstantiated allegation that
Muslim-American leaders are uncooperative with U.S. counterterrorism efforts"); see also
FAIZA

PATEL,

BRENNAN

CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y.

UNIV.

SCH.

OF LAW,

RETHINKING

RADICALIZATION 26-27 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3ff468del211ff853e
hwm6beul5.pdf (explaining that outreach meetings are generally perceived "as insincere"
and "as a one-way means for the government to gather information about community
members' religious practices").
166. See, e.g., Attorney General Eric Holder on Department ofJustice's Outreach and
Enforcement Efforts to Protect American Muslims, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 4, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090604.html
("We have a solemn
responsibility to protect our people while we also protect our principles."); Press Release,
Office of the Press Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on the Threat of Right-Wing Extremism
(Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/prl1239817562001.shtm ("We are on
the lookout for criminal and terrorist activity but we do not-nor will we ever-monitor
ideology or political beliefs. We take seriously our responsibility to protect the civil rights
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practices, for example, government officials have used the meetings
defensively, to "prove" they "did the right thing."l 6 7 At a December 2010
outreach meeting, Attorney General Eric Holder told a group of Muslim leaders
that he had "no apologies for how the FBI agents handled their work" and that
preemptive operations are an "essential law-enforcement tool."l 68
Even if government spokespersons genuinely believe their proclamations
of good faith, government actions indicate otherwise. The prosecution of
Yassin Aref exemplifies the concern that individuals are targeted for
investigation based on their unpopular political beliefs or religious practices.169
Further, the prosecution of trusted Muslim community leaders undermines the
legitimacy of community outreach meetings. For instance, the raid and arrest
of Hatem Abudayyeh, a longtime activist of the Arab American Action
Network, resulted in hundreds of individuals protesting outside FBI
headquarters in Chicago. 170
Counterterrorism tactics have led community leaders to resign themselves
to the ineffectiveness of government outreach to Muslim, Arab, and South
Asian communities.171 Such programs are perceived as nothing more than pro
forma, political cover for the government in the face of allegations of systemic
unlawful profiling. 172 To the extent that the government's outreach to Muslim
communities is genuine, the legitimacy of such outreach has been significantly

and liberties of the American people, including subjecting our activities to rigorous oversight
from numerous internal and external sources.").
167. See, e.g., Bartosiewicz, supra note 67 (discussing how, following a sting
operation at a local mosque, the FBI organized a series of meetings with local leaders to
address the community's outrage, but then refused permission to record the meetings and
asserted that the point was only to "prove" the FBI "did the right thing").
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., id ("When asked at a press conference following the sentencing [of
Aref and Hossain] whether there was anything connecting the defendants, particularly Aref,
to terrorism, the prosecuting attorney answered, 'Well, we didn't have the evidence of that,
but he had the ideology."').
170. See, e.g., Serena Maria Daniels & Andy Grimm, Activists Protest FBI Raids,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-09-27/news/ct-met-fbiprotest-0928-20100927 ljim-fennerty-activists-search-warrant (quoting Ahmed Rehab,
director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Chicago's chapter, as saying: "Hatem
is a longtime, respected leader in the community. It is unthinkable that he would have
This is an example of FBI overreach when it comes to
connections to terrorism ....
activism or commentary on the (Middle East) conflict."); see also Andy Grimm & Cynthia
Dizikes, FBI Raids Anti-War Activists' Homes, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 24, 2010), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2010-09-24/news/ct-met-fbi-terrorism-investigation-20100924 1 fbi-ag
ents-anti-war-activists-federal-agents.
171. See PATEL, supra note 165.
172. Id.
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impaired-so much so that some community leaders have ceased participation
in order to avoid condoning discriminatory practices.173
A recent freedom of information inquiry by the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") further exacerbated these relations by revealing that many of
the community outreach meetings have been used for collecting intelligence on
Muslim Americans.' 7 4 According to the ACLU, the FBI secretly recorded
names and conversations at community meetings, religious dinners, and job
fairs.
One 2008 document shows that an FBI agent "collected and
documented individuals' contact information and First Amendment-protected
opinions and associations, and conducted internet searches to obtain further
information about the individuals in attendance, including, in one instance, the
photo of a dinner participant."1 76 This helps explain why the government has
expressed insufficient concern for meaningfully addressing the communities'
grievances.
Apparently, officials are more concerned with gathering
intelligence than redressing alleged civil rights violations.
II. MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTES-THE LYNCHPIN
OF THE PREVENTIVE PARADIGM
The linchpin of the preventive counterterrorism paradigm is 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2339A and 2339B-laws prohibiting material support to terrorism.177 Too
often, the laws are the fallback criminal provisions employed when the
government cannot prove terrorism charges.

Material support laws are so

broad and vaguely worded that they effectively criminalize a myriad of

173.

Id.;

Abukar Arman, Op-Ed., Bridges of Rhetoric and Suspicion,
(Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/3398.cfm. ("[T]he
reality on the ground tells a different story-one in which rhetoric is abundant and substance
is scarce."); NYPD Spying on Muslims Leads to Spiral of Mistrust, HOMELAND SEC.
NEWSWIRE (Nov. 23, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20ll
1123-nypd-spying-on-muslims-leads-to-spiral-of-mistrust ("Following the revelation that the
New York City police department was spying on the daily lives of ordinary Muslims,
community activists have launched a campaign encouraging people to avoid directly
reporting suspicious activity to the police.").
174. Ryan J. Reilly, Muslim Officials Want Answers from FBI over Data Collection
During Outreach Efforts, TPMMUCKRAKER (Dec. 1, 2011, 5:45 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.
talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/12/muslim-officials-want-answers-from-fbi-over-data-coll
ection duringoutreachefforts.php.
175. Eileen Sullivan, ACLU: FBI Used Outreach to Collect Info on Muslims,
SALON.COM (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/12/01/aclu-fbi used
outreach to collect info on muslims/.
176. See Reilly, supra note 174.
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (Supp. IV 2010).
WORLDPRESS.ORG
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Moreover, the
activities that would otherwise be constitutionally protected.
statutes do not require the government to prove the defendant had specific
intent to support terrorism, thereby granting the government carte blanche to
prosecute a broad range of legitimate activities, such as charitable giving,
peacebuilding, and human rights advocacy.' 79 The Department of Justice, with
the Supreme Court's blessing, has criminalized training and advocacy in
support of nonviolence where the executive branch determines such activities
present a security threat to a United States national or to the United States
itself.1so The government's standards for furthering terrorist means are so
broad that they arguably prohibit legal defense of designated terrorists in
constitutional litigation.' 8 1
Similarly, humanitarian aid delivered to noncombatant civilians is now
illicit based on the theory that it frees up resources to redirect toward violence.
This untenable theory of liability, also known as the "fungibility" theory,' 8 2

178. David Cole, The Roberts Court vs. Free Speech, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (Aug. 19,
2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/aug/19/roberts-court-vs-free-speech/
?pagination=false. Professor David Cole of Georgetown University Law Center writes:
Under this [material support] law, when former President Jimmy Carter monitored
the June 2009 elections in Lebanon, and met with each of the parties to advise
them on fair election practices, he could have been prosecuted for providing
"material support," in the form of "expert advice," to a designated group, because
he advised Hezbollah. When The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The
Washington Post published Op-Eds by Hamas leaders in recent years, they, too,
were committing the crime of providing "material support" to a designated
terrorist group, because doing so provided Hamas a "service."
Id.
179. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B.
180. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010).
181. See Cole, supra note 178. The logic behind these standards is that the "taint" of
terrorism is so severe that any support for terrorist actors "legitimizes and furthers their
terrorist means." HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2710, 2725. But this reasoning
creates a slippery slope. As Justice Breyer aptly stated, "this 'legitimacy' justification
cannot by itself warrant suppression of political speech, advocacy, and association" because
if it did, "the First Amendment battle would be lost in untold instances where it should be
won." Id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. The Supreme Court has explained this theory as follows:
Money is fungible, and "[w]hen foreign terrorist organizations that have a dual
structure raise funds, they highlight the civilian and humanitarian ends to which
such moneys could be put." But "there is reason to believe that foreign terrorist
organizations do not maintain legitimate financial firewalls between those funds
raised for civil, nonviolent activities, and those ultimately used to support violent,
terrorist operations." Thus, "[flunds raised ostensibly for charitable purposes have
in the past been redirected by some terrorist groups to fund the purchase of arms
and explosives."
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725-26 (alternations in original) (citations
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"jeopardizes the provision of aid and disaster relief in conflict zones" by
preventing the receipt of food, water, and shelter to innocent beneficiaries
abroad.'83 In other words, but for the misfortune of being trapped in a conflict
zone where one party is designated as terrorist, civilians can be denied muchneeded aid from American civil society. This consequence is especially
disastrous in areas, such as Somalia, Sri Lanka, Gaza, and Northwest
Pakistan,' where a designated organization exercises governmental or quasigovernmental control, thus making it impossible to provide humanitarian aid
without dealing with the designated group. Furthermore, American charities
that provide the humanitarian aid are often punished through public smear
campaigns and prosecutions.' 85
omitted) (quoting Joint Appendix at 134-35, HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 3877534, at *134-35).
183. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Rules
"Material Support" Law Can Stand (June 21, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/
supreme-court-rules-material-support-law-can-stand (arguing that the Court's decision in
HumanitarianLaw Project "jeopardizes the provision of aid and disaster relief in conflict
zones controlled by designated groups").
184. The State Department's list of designated terrorist organizations includes AlShabaab (Somalia), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), Hamas (Gaza), and
Tehrik-e Taliban (Pakistan). See Foreign Terrorist Organizations,U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Jan.
27, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. Each of these groups exerts
either official or de facto control over the areas in which they operate.
185. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 42 (noting that the government
put KindHearts out of operation by freezing the charity's assets without instituting criminal
proceedings or designating KindHearts as a terrorist organization); see also Patrick Poole,
Terrorist Fundraisersfor Obama, FRONTPAGE MAG. (Apr. 23, 2008), http://archive.
frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=30693 (listing KindHearts officials and their
supposed "tie[s] to terrorist fundraising and support"); Press Release No. JS-4058, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Freezes Assets of Organization Tied to Hamas (Feb. 19,
2006), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j s4058.aspx (announcing
that KindHearts' assets were to be blocked pending investigation of whether the charity
provided support to terrorist organizations). This government action amounts to a smear
campaign. See Press Release No. JS-4058, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra (quoting Stuart
Levey, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, as saying,
"KindHearts is the progeny of Holy Land Foundation and Global Relief Foundation, which
attempted to mask their support for terrorism behind the fagade of charitable giving."). As
one article explained:
One of the problems with the war on terror is that, when organization connected to
terrorist groups overseas are shut down by the United States, far too many of those
active in the groups are awarded freedom without punishment, enabled to continue
their activities with impunity, while exploiting legal loopholes and public
sentiment in which charity and cheerful-sounding names evoke. KindHearts is one
of those organizations.
Joe Kaufman, The Black Hearts ofKindHearts, FRONTPAGE MAG. (Mar. 14, 2006), http:/
archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=5236.
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The adverse effect of this discriminatory targeting of American Muslim
charities does more than simply chill religious freedom;' 86 it undermines the
country's credibility in its publicized outreach initiative to Muslims and
impedes its foreign policy in the Middle East. Muslims abroad view treatment
of Muslims in America as a litmus test of American sincerity vis-A-vis its
various initiatives, such as democratization projects, the defense of human
rights, and the strengthening of civil society. When Muslims see discrimination
by the American government against American Muslims, they reasonably
question the legitimacy of the United States' proclaimed leadership in
supporting liberal democratic ideals abroad. Such double-talk, therefore,
renders the United States irrelevant (or obstructive) in international forums
addressing anti-discrimination, human rights, and the rule of law.
A. DisproportionateEnforcement Against Muslim Charities

With few exceptions, the executive branch has exercised its broad
discretion to selectively target Muslim charities providing seemingly legitimate
The result is a serious chilling effect on Muslim
humanitarian aid.
communities' willingness to openly partake in political dissent and the
inhibition of Muslim charities from effectively providing aid with religiously
mandated charitable donations. 8
Since 9/11, Muslim donors have been scared to make charitable
contributions because they fear prosecution for providing material support to
They also fear that their donations will invite government scrutiny
terrorism.
and harassment in the form of immigration checks, requests for voluntary FBI
interviews, inclusion on watch lists, and surveillance. o Indeed, donations to
186. See David Cole, Guilt by Association Squared: Extending the Bounds of the
'MaterialSupport' Statute, AM. CONST. Soc'Y BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/
acsblog/guilt-by-association-squared-extending-the-bounds-of-the-'material-support'-statute
(arguing that two material support cases pending in federal court "threaten to ... chill the
legitimate humanitarian aid activities of countless charities and foundations across the
United States").
187. Seven out of the nine U.S. charities shut down pending terrorism-related
investigation or designation are Muslim charities. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra
note 19, at 8.
188. See Eric Gorski, U.S. Muslims Experiencing Anxiety over Roles, DENVER PosT
(Aug. 19, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/frontpage/ci_18692208 (quoting a
local imam as stating that his mosque shut down because "IRS scrutiny of giving to Islamic
charitable organizations had a chilling effect on donations").
189. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 92-93 (reporting that donation
levels in many charities and mosques are down by at least fifty percent).
190.

See, e.g., OMB WATCH, MUSLIM CHARITIES AND THE WAR ON TERROR 5, 89 (rev.

2006), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/files//npadv/PDF/MuslimCharitiesTopTenUp
dated.pdf ("Many in the Muslim community fear that their donations might land them on a
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Muslim charities fell precipitously in the years immediately following 9/11.191
Ten years after 9/11, many Muslim charities still struggle to obtain pre-9/1 1
donation levels.192
The government's closure and terrorist designation of three of the largest
Muslim American charities immediately following the 9/11 attacks sent
shockwaves through Muslim communities nationwide.' 93 During the 2001
Ramadan season-when Muslim charitable giving is at its yearly peak-the
federal government froze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development, the Global Relief Foundation, and the Benevolence International
Foundation.194 The subsequent criminal prosecution of the Holy Land
Foundation's leaders' 95 alarmed Muslim donors, who reasonably feared that
even the most tenuous association with a Muslim charity could lead to ruinous
consequences.196 As of June 2009, seven of the nine charities with assets
seized by the Department of the Treasury as a result of terrorism-related
investigation or designation were Muslim charities.' 97
Unbeknownst to many, a formal terrorist designation is not necessary to
figuratively "tar and feather" a charity. A mere investigation by the executive

list of suspected terrorist sympathizers and supporters, even if they are completely unaware
of any wrongdoing or if the charity comes under suspicion years later.").
191. One charitable organization observed:
In this climate of fear and suspicion, donations to Muslim charities have declined
Some Muslim donors are turning to
significantly since last Ramadan.
nondenominational groups and local causes, while others are choosing to give
anonymous cash donations-a practice that ends up hindering the government's
ability to prevent terrorist financing and demonstrates the extent to which the right
to give openly has been compromised.
Id. at 5.
192. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 92-93.
193. Id at 7; see also Aziz, supra note 56, at 45, 46.
194. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 7.
195. See id. at 61-63.
196. See Kathryn A. Ruff, Note, Scared to Donate: An Examination of the Effects of
DesignatingMuslim Charitiesas Terrorist Organizationson the FirstAmendment Rights of
Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 447-73 (2005) ("While some of those
fears are grounded in the possibility of actually funding terrorism, a greater reason for the

drop in religious donations is that many Muslims are afraid of becoming targets of law
enforcement and branded as terrorists due to their connections with a charity that comes
under investigation.").
197. The seven Muslim charities are the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation-USA in
Oregon, the Benevolence International Foundation in Illinois, the Global Relief Foundation
in Illinois, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development in Texas, the Islamic
American Relief Agency-USA in Missouri, the Goodwill Charitable Organization in
Michigan, and KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development in Ohio. AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 11.
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branch is enough to trigger the asset-freezing provision of sanctions laws,' 9 8
thus paralyzing the organization. The law does not require probable cause of a
violation of the regulations, nor must the government seek approval from a
judge before or after the freeze is imposed.1 99 Further, the investigation and
resulting freeze have no limits.200 The ensuing public media coverage of the
freeze puts the final nail in the organization's coffin, as subsequent association
with the organization is an invitation for government scrutiny. Before
December 2010, organizations were denied access to their funds to hire a
defense lawyer unless the Department of the Treasury, the adverse party in any
such litigation, authorized such expenditures.201 In one instance where the
Department did make funds available, the amount was a small fraction of the
cost of hiring competent counsel. 202
Further, lawyers were prohibited from representing accused defendants
without obtaining a license from the Office of Foreign Asset Control ("OFAC")
until the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") challenged
the procedures in 2010.203 Prior to the action, such representation was only
204
Compensated services
permitted under a very limited set of circumstances.
were also severely restricted, permitting charities to fund their legal services

198. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2006); OMB WATCH, supra note 190, at 2 (stating
that the executive branch has "largely unchecked power" to seize groups' materials, assets
and property pending investigation into terrorism ties); Aziz, supra note 56, at 54 ("The
[International Emergency Economic Powers Act's] asset freezing provision applies to 'any
foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that [the President] determines has
planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States
... ,' as well as to suspect domestic organization, regardless of their affiliation with a
specific attack." (second alteration in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (Supp. II
2000))).
199. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C).
200. Id.
201. New Treasury Rule Improves Access to Lawyers for Listed Charities, CHARITY &
SEC. NETWORK (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/TreasuryImproves
AccessLawyers Charities.
202. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on All Counts at 53-59, KindHearts for
Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 676 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (No.
3:08CV2400) (arguing that KindHearts had a constitutional right to use its funds to pay for
its legal defense).
203. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Geithner, No 1:10-cv-01303-JDB (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2010).
204. See id. at 7 (citing prior versions of 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.101-.901, specifically
§ 594.506(a)).

2011/12]

SELECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM

465

only through funds raised outside the United States or, after obtaining a license,
through money raised by legal defense funds.205
The new regulations issued in December 2010 now permit American
lawyers to provide pro bono representation in any proceeding before a court
without obtaining a license.206 The regulations also permit charities or persons
to pay for legal services without obtaining a license if the services involve,
among other things, "counseling on the requirements of and compliance with
U.S. law," "[r]epresentation of persons named as defendants or parties to
domestic U.S legal proceedings," and "[a]ny other legal services where U.S.
law requires access to legal counsel at public expense." 207 If the needed legal
services are neither pro bono nor falling within one of the aforementioned
exceptions, the charity or person must still obtain a license and can use one of
only two approved payment methods: (1) payment from the charity or person's
non-American sources, or (2) payment from a legal defense fund at an
American financial institution.
Prior to the new regulations, the negative
publicity of an asset freeze coupled with the inability to access funds for legal
counsel sounded the charity's death knell.
In addition to the seven shut down Muslim American charities, 209 six other
Muslim American charities have found themselves at the center of publicly
announced terrorism investigations, raids, and surveillance.210 Unable to
overcome the resulting stigma and blacklisting, three have permanently closed
without ever being designated as a terrorist organization. 211

205. See, e.g., KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (finding OFAC's policy restricting
the use of blocked assets for compensation of legal services to be reasonable and facially
valid, but arbitrarily and capriciously applied in KindHearts' case).
206. Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,904, 75,906 (Dec. 7,
2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.506, .517 (2011)); New Treasury Rule Improves Access
to Lawyers for Listed Charities,supra note 201; see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Government Changes Attorney Licensing Regulations in Response to Lawsuit Filed
by CCR and ACLU (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/governmentchanges-attorney-licensing-regulations-response-lawsuit-filed-ccr-and-a.
207. See New Treasury Rule Improves Access to Lawyers for Listed Charities, supra
note 201.
208. Id.
209. See AM. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 11.
210. The six charities are KinderUSA in Texas, Life for Relief and Development in
Michigan, Al-Mabarrat in Michigan, Child Foundation in Oregon, Help the Needy in New
York, and Care International in Massachusetts. See id. at 12.
211. Help the Needy and Care International have closed. Id. KindHearts also
announced its closing in January 2012. Jim Sielicki, Charity Targeted by Treasury
Dissolves, TOLEDO BLADE (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2012/01/09/
Charity-targeted-by-Treasury-dissolves.html.
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B. Guilt Without Proofof Wrongdoing

At least one court has interpreted material support laws in a way that
relieves prosecutors from having to prove that a charity provided donations
directly to a designated foreign terrorist organization. In United States v. El-

Mezain ("Holy Land Foundation"), a Texas federal district court instructed the
jury that providing humanitarian aid to nongovernmental groups abroad that are
not designated as terrorist organizations makes American charities and their
officers guilty of § 2339B if those groups are later shown to be fronts for, or
controlled by, a designated terrorist organization. 212
The Holy Land
Foundation defendants were convicted based on their donations to local
zakat2 13 committees that provided direct humanitarian aid to impoverished
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 2 14 The zakat committees, which have
never been designated as terrorist organizations, were indi enous nonprofit
organizations with necessary networks for distributing aid.
Indeed, the
United States Agency for International Development ("USAID") and the

212. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
To find a defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 2 through 10, you must
find that the government has proven each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: First: that the defendant under consideration knowingly
provided, or attempted to provide, the material support alleged in the count under
consideration to the entity listed in that count; Second: that the entity listed in the
count under consideration was controlled by Hamas or that the defendant under
consideration was attempting to provide support to Hamas by providing or
attempting to provide the support to the entity listed in the count under
consideration; Third: that the defendant under consideration either knew that
Hamas was designated as a foreign terrorist organization, or he knew that Hamas
has engaged in, or engages in, terrorist activity; and Fourth: that the court has
jurisdiction over the crime charged in the count under consideration.
Amicus Brief of Charities, Foundations, Conflict-Resolution Groups, & Constitutional
Rights Organizations in Support of Defendants & Urging Reversal of Convictions of Counts
2-10 at 9-10, United States v. El-Mezain, No. 09-10560 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 2010); see also
Ruff, supra note 196, at 476 (stating that despite KinderUSA's specific attempts to structure
its practices to comply with material support laws, it nevertheless stopped soliciting
donations due to FBI surveillance, wiretapping, attempts to subvert employees, and the
government's spreading of malicious information).
213. Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, requires that Muslims donate a certain
amount of their annual earnings to charity. See Liz Leslie, Ramadan and Charity: What Is
Zakat?, MUSLIM VOICES (July 28, 2010), http://muslimvoices.org/ramadan-charity-zakat/.
214. See Conviction of Holy Land Foundation Raises Questions, Concerns for
Nonprofits, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/
news/Conviction HolyLandRaises Questions_Concems Nonprofits.
215. See id
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International Red Cross ("IRC") often worked with the same zakat committees
to deliver aid to Palestinians. 216
Despite USAID's and IRC's similar work in the Palestinian territories, the
Holy Land Foundation ("HLF") and its Muslim officers were convicted of
providing material support to Hamas, a designated terrorist group, on account
of donations to the undesignated zakat committees.217 The trial court
erroneously instructed the jury that if some individuals in the zakat committees
were associated with Hamas, HLF's donations constituted material support to
Hamas, even if the American charity lacked knowledge of such associations. 218
Thus, although the government could not prove that HLF's donations were
transferred to Hamas or that HLF had any knowledge of these committees'
alleged ties to Hamas, HLF was found guilty based on its contribution to the
undesignated groups.219 This tenuous and arguably unconstitutional theory of

liability ultimately exposes all American humanitarian aid agencies operating
in conflict zones where designated terrorist groups exist. That USAID can
engage in the same activity without sanction further evinces the politicization
of humanitarian aid.
The serious legal implications of the Holy Land Foundation case caused
twenty of the United States' largest nonprofits and foundations to file an
amicus brief asking the Fifth Circuit to interpret the material support statute to
require proof of knowledge that a recipient of assistance is a designated group
or is controlled by one.220 Amici argued that the district court's jury
instructions denied individuals fair notice of what is prohibited and failed to
require proof of individual culpability.221 Further, amici noted that the district
court's interpretation "jeopardize[d] the legitimate charitable work of countless
foundations and charities throughout the United States." 222 The interpretation
thus expanded criminal culpability such that many organizations engaged in
humanitarian assistance in troubled parts of the world are now exposed to

216. Id ("[Tihe same zakat committees have received aid from the International Red
Cross and the U.S. Agency for International Development.").
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Amicus Brief of Charities, Foundations, Conflict-Resolution Groups, &
Constitutional Rights Organizations in Support of Defendants & Urging Reversal of
Convictions of Counts 2-10, supra note 212, at 1, 21, 23, 25; see also BriefArgues Material
Support Conviction Should Require Knowledge of Terror Connection, CHARITY & SEC.
NETWORK (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/Brief ArguesMaterial_
Support ConvictionShouldRequireKnowledge of TerrorConnection.
221. Amicus Brief of Charities, Foundations, Conflict-Resolution Groups, &
Constitutional Rights Organizations in Support of Defendants & Urging Reversal of
Convictions of Counts 2-10, supra note 212, at 15-21.
222. Id. at 1.
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prosecution that they can do little to prevent.223 Ultimately, "the [resulting]
chilling effect" will devastate their important work and deny beneficiaries
humanitarian aid.224 Unfortunately in December 2011, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit balked on the issue presented by amici, noting that
no defendants had raised the issue on appeal.225
The amici included large and reputable nonprofit organizations, such as the
Carter Center, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Constitution Project, the
Council on Foundations, and the Samuel Rubin Foundation.22 6 Their
participation demonstrates these laws' broader adverse consequences,
notwithstanding their selective enforcement against Muslim groups and
individuals.
Although material support laws were initially enforced against Muslim
communities, aggressive prosecution has since spread to other groups as the
government seeks to convince the public that it is actively protecting national
security. The 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw
Project227 brought to light the broad-reaching adverse implications of loosely
drawn and broadly interpreted laws prohibiting material support to terrorism.
The plaintiffs, a former federal administrative law judge and American-based
advocacy groups, sought to persuade the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey
("PKK"), a designated foreign terrorist organization, to move away from
violence.228 While the PKK engaged in violent activities, the plaintiffs
expressly sought to train members to use humanitarian and international law to
resolve disputes peacefully and to petition the United Nations and other
representative bodies for humanitarian relief.229
To the dismay of many peacebuilding and humanitarian aid organizations,
the Supreme Court found that the law criminalizing the plaintiffs' activities was
constitutional. 230 The ruling thereby made it illegal for Americans to teach
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1-2; see also David Cole, Op-Ed., Chewing Gum for Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 3, 2011, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/opinion/
03cole.html.
225. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 539 n.32 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that
although "[a]n amicus brief filed by a diverse group of organizations challenge[d] the district
court's jury charge on the substantive violations of § 2339B based on the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause," the issue was not properly before the court because no defendant had
raised the issue).
226. Amicus Brief of Charities, Foundations, Conflict-Resolution Groups, &
Constitutional Rights Organizations in Support of Defendants & Urging Reversal of
Convictions of Counts 2-10, supra note 212, at i-ii.
227. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
228. Id. at 2729.
229.

Id.

230. See id at 2731; see also Press Release, The Constitution Project, Constitution
Project Dismayed by Supreme Court's Rejection of Constitutional Challenge to Provisions
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designated terrorist groups to put down their guns, pick up their pens, invoke
international human rights law, and seek redress through international tribunals.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer thus criticized the majority's failure to
differentiate between aiding terrorist groups that engage in violent terrorist acts
and those that participate in legitimate democracy-building advocacy. 2 3 1
The criminalization of aid and advocacy directly contradicts America's
stated commitment to international human rights law and sends a message to
the world that the United States is not serious about human rights and peaceful
conflict resolution. Moreover, the ruling undermines American civil society as
the independent nonprofit sector plays a pivotal role in international
peacebuilding efforts and the provision of humanitarian aid to impoverished
civilians trapped in conflict zones.232 The Court's interpretation of the material
support laws essentially limits international peacebuilding efforts to highly
politicized, and often ineffective, government programs sponsored by the State
Department or USAID. 23 3 In the end, this current formulation and
interpretation of material support laws undermines our nation's reputation in
the international community, our national security interests in minimizing
violence and terrorism abroad, and our own civil society. 234
C. CollateralProsecutionandSurveillance of Muslim Donors

While few individual donors have been prosecuted for material support
arising out of charges brought against charities,235 some have experienced
of Material Support Laws (June 21, 2010), http://www.constitutionproject.org/news/2010/
06212010n constitution.php; Supreme Court Upholds Ban on Peaceful Conflict Resolution
Support to Terrorist Groups, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (June 21, 2010), http://www.
charityandsecurity.org/news/Supreme CourtBan PeacefulConflictResolutionSupport
Terrorist Groups (reporting how one law professor commented that "the ruling will
adversely impact peace groups hoping to turn terrorist groups away from violence").
231. See HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2731-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. See OMB WATCH, supra note 190, at 2.
233.
DEF.,

See, e.g., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & U.S. DEP'T OF

QUARTERLY

PROGRESS

AND OVERSIGHT

REPORT ON THE CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM INPAKISTAN AS OF DECEMBER 31,2010 (2010), available at http://www.usaid.gov/

oig/public/special reports/pakistan quarterly report as-ofdec_31_2010.pdf.
234. Specifically, the HumanitarianLaw Projectruling undermines the independence
of American civil society through human rights advocacy. Ironically, just weeks after the
Court's ruling in HumanitarianLaw Project, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton touted the
necessity of a strong civil society as one of the "essential elements of a free nation." Hillary
Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Civil Society: Supporting Democracy in the 21st
Century, Address Before the Community of Democracies (July 3, 2010) (transcript and
video recording available at U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/
07/143952.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2012)).
235.

But see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 74 (describing the well-

known case of a Palestinian American and former imam of a Georgia mosque who pleaded
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collateral rosecution236 for tax, immigration, and other nonterrorism related
charges.23 Many Muslim community members believe that their donations to
Muslim charities invite government scrutiny that may otherwise not have
Muslim donors worry that they will become targets of
occurred. 238
investigation and prosecution if the government becomes aware of their
donations, especially to charities engaged in humanitarian relief efforts abroad.
They fear that donor lists of Muslim charities, either designated or under
investigation, are a starting point for investigating terrorism, even where there
is no individualized evidence of wrongdoing. 39 Hence these lists are suspected
of serving as the starting point for fishing expeditions in search of terrorists.
Such fears are not far-fetched.
Major donors to Muslim charities report experiencing burdensome tax
audits, denials of citizenship applications, unusually vigorous immigration
enforcement, and surveillance.
Major donors have also been targeted for
interviews regarding "their charitable donations and knowledge of Muslim
charities' activities locally and nationally." 241 The ACLU, the Asian Law
Caucus, Muslim Advocates, and the Arab American Anti-Discrimination
Committee, among others, have all documented complaints about such
targeting.242 Some of these interviews are involuntary, as they occur at the
border when individuals attempt to return from abroad.24 3 Others are a result of

guilty in August 2006 to charges of materially supporting terrorism through donations to the
Holy Land Foundation).
236. Collateral prosecution of American Muslim donors involves arrests or
indictments that, while "not officially related to the donors' charitable contributions," are
assumed to have been "prompted by their donations." Id. at 73.
237. See id at 73-75; see also Huq, supra note 21, at 839-40 (noting the Justice
Department's use of inchoate offenses and immigration regulation as a tool in the preventive
counterterrorism model).
238. See Gorski, supra note 188. See generally Aziz, supra note 56.
239. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 69-70 (citing a 2005
investigation by the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance that reviewed financial records given
to the IRS, including the donor lists of two dozen Muslim charities).
240. Id. at 73-74 (highlighting the case of Jesse Maali, who was prosecuted for
violations of immigration, employment, and tax law after his large donations to Muslim
charities came to the attention of federal agents).
241. Id. at 69.
242. Id. at 69-73.
243.

See, e.g., COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL

RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2009: SEEKING FULL INCLUSION 19, 27 (2009), available at

http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/CAIR-2009-Civil-Rights-Report.pdf (noting cases of
Muslims who were stopped at border crossings and detained for hours without explanation);
Oralandar Brand Williams, CAIR Says Muslim Americans Harassedwhen CrossingBorder,
DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.detnews.com/article/20110325/METRO/10325
0392/CAIR-says-Muslim-Americans-harassed-when-crossing-border (reporting a call for a
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ubiquitous FBI requests for voluntary interviews, which many community
members accept without legal representation as an earnest, but ill-advised,
gesture to prove their innocence. The ACLU, for instance, "has documented
reports of law enforcement targeting of Muslim donors in Texas, Michigan,
New York, Virginia, Florida, Louisiana, California, Minnesota, Missouri, and
Wisconsin for 'voluntary' interviews." 244 And other interviews occur abroad
when individuals are prohibited from returning to the United States after trips
to Muslim communities. 2 45 Adding to mistrust among Muslims is the fact that
interviews sometimes result in criminal charges for material false statements
unrelated to terrorist activities.246
D. FeasibleSolutions Rejected by the Government

In response to this problematic process, a broad coalition of highly
regarded nonprofit organizations has urged the Department of the Treasury to
amend its Anti-Terrorism Financing Guidelines to reflect the industry's own
body of "best practice" guidance for charities in the U.S. and abroad.247
Moreover, the Charity and Security Network has developed model rules to
protect the due process rights of U.S. charities during the designation and
investigation process. 248 Such protections are necessary because current law
prevents a designated249 nonprofit organization from meaningfully defending
itself from allegations of supporting terrorism. Once an organization is
designated, its assets are frozen without notice or an opportunity to defend

federal investigation into the routine harassment of Arab and Muslim Americans at U.S.
border crossings).
244. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 19, at 69.
245. See, e.g., Nigel Duara, Ore. Man Asks Why He Was Queried by FBI in Tunisia,
YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/ore-man-asks-why-queried-fbitunisia-001231680.html (reporting that the FBI placed a Libyan American on a no-fly list
while he was attempting to return from delivering humanitarian supplies in Libya, then
questioned him about his religious beliefs and his mosque).
246. See, e.g., Islamic Singer Sentenced in False Statements Case, SEATTLE TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2010, 7:30 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/entertainment/2013680098
apusmichiganhamassupport.html (reporting that a prominent Muslim singer, who was also
a Holy Land Foundation representative in 1997 and 1998, pleaded guilty to making false
statements during the immigration process and was deported).
247. Nonprofit Groups End Talks with Treasury About Ineffectual Guidelines,
CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/
Nonprofit Groups_EndTalksWithTreasuryaboutIneffectualGuidelines.
248. Model Policies for Fair Procedures for Listing and Delisting U.S. Charities,
CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK, http://www.charityandsecurity.org/solutions/modeldue_
processprocedures charities (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
249. See discussion supra note 56; see also Aziz, supra note 56, at 51-55.
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itself.2o Further, the absence of a mechanism comparable to the Classified
Information Procedures Act-which generally allows defendants to confront
classified evidence presented against them-prevents the nonprofit
organization from reviewing the entire record of evidence used against it.251
Nor is the nonprofit organization permitted to offer evidence in its own defense
at the pre-designation or federal appeals process. 252 The absence of minimal
due process rights undermines the legitimacy of the designation process,
suggesting that it is as much about political showmanship as it is about law. 253
This author, through coalition efforts, has proposed thoughtful solutions to
these concerns that are blithely dismissed by Department of the Treasury and
White House officials. 254 For example, rather than maintaining a process that
assumes guilt without the benefit of the organization's defense, designated
groups should be afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves
promptly in the wake of an asset freeze. Further, the government should have
to disclose sufficient information regarding its classified case to allow the
group a meaningful defense. Designated groups should also be provided notice
of the charges against them and a statement of the reasons for designation,
neither of which is currently required.2 ss
Officials often cite the ease with which an organization may transfer
money abroad to avoid having its assets frozen for illicit acts. 256 While such
250. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(a)(4)(B)(iv)(II), (c)(1)-(3) (2006).
251. Compare id, and 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2006), with 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16
(2006) (Classified Information Procedures Act).
252. Model Policies for Fair Proceduresfor Listing and Delisting U.S. Charities,
supra note 248 ("Charities . . . cannot present evidence in an appeal to the federal courts.").
But see 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (2011) (providing administrative review and an opportunity to
submit additional evidence only after an entity is designated or has its property seized). See
generally Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d
1233, 1250 (D. Or. 2008) (relying on a declaration that the government submitted outside the
record to provide background information on its designation procedures), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011).
253. E.g., RON SusKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY 191-99 (2004); Julie B. Shapiro, The
Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Effect on the
SeparationofPowers, 6 CARDOZO PuB. L. POt'Y & ETHICS J. 547, 583, 599 (2008).
254. See, e.g., Nonprofit Groups End Talks with Treasury About Ineffectual
Guidelines, supra note 247.
255. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189; 50 U.S.C. § 1702; see also Aziz, supra note 56, at 68-78
(providing a more detailed examination of the due process shortcomings of the terrorist
designation process).
256. See Victoria B. Bjorklund et al., Terrorism and Money Laundering: Illegal
Purposesand Activities, 25 PACE L. REV. 233, 242 (2005); Press Release No. HP-404, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Testimony of Chip Poncy Director, Office of Strategic Policy, for

Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes U.S. Department of the Treasury Before the U.S.
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (May 10, 2007), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp404.aspx.
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concerns are reasonable, they too can be addressed without compromising the
nonprofit's due process rights. For example, an independent conservator can
be appointed to oversee the charity's finances pending investigation.257 This
assures the government that funds will not be transferred out of its jurisdiction
and prevents the collective punishment of the entire organization, as well as its
donors and beneficiaries, on account of mere allegations.
Likewise,
government investigations should adopt the same policy toward charities that it
applies to corporations suspected of fraud, where the focus is first on individual
bad actors, rather than the elimination of the entire corporation.258 So long as
the organization can show that it acted in good faith and that any wrongdoing
was a result of a limited number of individuals, it should be spared total
liquidation. This more reasonable approach not only protects charitable
organizations, but also its beneficiaries who are in desperate need of lawful
humanitarian assistance.
Additionally, while new regulations permitting a charity to pay for
particular legal services are welcome,259 there is little justification for the
government's continued refusal to allow an undesignated charity-that is, a
charity merely under investigation-access to its funds for services that are not
the focus of the investigation. This is especially appropriate with large
charities that operate in various countries, whereas the government's concerns
may be limited to operations in a particular country or a specific project. The
government has yet to provide a reasonable explanation, other than its punitive
preventive philosophy, for these broad measures. Moreover, once the government freezes the funds, it refuses all requests to release them to other charitable
organizations performing the same work in accordance with the cy pres
doctrine. 260 Under the cy pres doctrine, if a charitable purpose of an
organization becomes unlawful, impracticable, or impossible, a court may order

257. See Sahar Aziz, A Comparison of Due Process Rights in Terrorist Designation
Processes to the Charity and Security Network's Model, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK 4 (Jan 3,
2011), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/system/files/comparison chart.pdf.
258. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads
of Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/
cftf/corporate guidelines.htm ("Because a corporation can act only through individuals,
imposition of individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future
corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued,
even in the face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.").
259. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
260. See Principles and Proceduresfor Release of Frozen Funds for Charitable
Purposes, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK, http://www.charityandsecurity.org/Solution/Proced

uresRelease Funds Charity (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (proposing that the Treasury
Department's regulations incorporate the cy pres doctrine and require charitable funds to be
used for purposes consistent with the donors' intent).

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

474

[Vol. 47:2

the money be delivered to another institution to be spent in a manner consistent
with the donors' charitable purposes.261
Representatives of the nonprofit sector have requested that the Department
of the Treasury, as sole controller of the frozen assets, transfer the money to
another charity operating consistent with the donors' intent.262 Tellingly, the
government has denied these requests with no regard for the needs of intended
beneficiaries.26 3 Such behavior evinces the politicization of counterterrorism
that, thus far, has most adversely impacted Muslim charities and individuals.
At stake is far more than the due process rights of a particular organization
and the sustainability of the nonprofit sector, both of which are important in
their own right. Equally significant is the legitimacy of the U.S. government's
counterterrorism strategy. If the government is truly committed to effective
counterterrorism strategies, it should acknowledge the failings of the
designation regime and implement the nonprofit sector's thoughtful
recommendations. 264 Such efforts would significantly improve the Muslim
community's perception of preventative measures and facilitate meaningful
engagement among the government and the Muslim American community.
III. THE RACIAL SUBTEXT OF "HOMEGROWN TERRORISM" POST-9/11
The policies surrounding "homegrown terrorism" have become the most
troubling aspect of the government's preventive counterterrorism model. This
politically charged term used to conjure up images of Timothy McVeigh, the
Unibomber, and extremist right-wing militia groups. Since 9/11, however,
"homegrown terrorism" has become infused with the racial subtext of "Muslim
domestic terrorists" as a result of racial and religious stereotyping in the media
This new pejorative
that is further legitimized by the government.2 65
261. Morris v. E.A. Morris Charitable Found., 589 S.E.2d 414, 416 (2003); 14 C.J.S.
Charities§ 45 (2006).
262. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 101 (2004), available at http://www.9-11

commission.gov/staff statements/911 TerrFin Monograph.pdf; Nonprofits Call for Release
of Frozen Funds for Humanitarian Efforts, OMB WATCH (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.
ombwatch.org/node/3094.
263.

See ROTH ET AL., supra note 262.

264. For more information on proposed solutions to the processes surrounding the
designation of terrorist organizations, see ProposedSolutions, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK,
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/solution/Proposed%20Solutions (last visited Jan. 10,
2012).
265. The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that
Community's Response: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of Rep. Keith Ellison) ("Targeting the Muslim American community for
the actions of a few is unjust.") (prepared testimony available at CONGRESSMAN KEITH

ELLISON,

http://ellison.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=587:
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connotation facilitates the selective enforcement of counterterrorism laws
against Muslims and legitimizes widespread discrimination.
While preventing domestic terrorism is undoubtedly an important public
safety concern, the current debate misguidedly focuses only on terrorism
committed by Muslims. 2 66 Meanwhile non-Muslims may be engaging in
terrorist activities undetected because they do not fit into the government's
established racial or religious profiles.267 In fact, a recent study reveals
"Islamist terrorism has been no more deadly in the United States than other
congressman-ellisons-testimony-to-the-house-committee-on-homeland-security-as-preparedfor-delivery&catid=36:keiths-blog&ltemid=44); LAURA W. MURPHY & MICHAEL W.
MACLEOD-BALL, AM. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY (2011), available

at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/FinalstatementforFeb_201 1 KingHearing.pdf
("Broadly targeting the entire American Muslim community for counterterrorism
enforcement will make it more likely that law enforcement officials will misunderstand the
factual evidence surrounding risk factors for violence and focus their investigative efforts on
innocent Americans because of their religious beliefs rather than on true threats to the
community."); COREY P. SAYLOR, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, WRITTEN
STATEMENT OF THE COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS ON THE EXTENT OF
RADICALIZATION IN THE AMERICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND THAT COMMUNITY's RESPONSE,
SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY (2011), available at

http://www.cair.com/ActionCenter/PeterKingHearings.aspx (pleading Congress to "[r]efuse
to offer a legitimizing platform to those who spout anti-Muslim bigotry").
266. See, e.g., RICK "OZZIE" NELSON & BEN BODURIAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L
STUDIES, A GROWING TERRORIST THREAT? ASSESSING "HOMEGROWN" EXTREMISM IN THE

UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/100304_Nelson_
GrowingTerroristThreatWeb.pdf (highlighting five case studies of homegrown terrorism
where all of the defendants are Muslim without mention of terrorism cases committed by
non-Muslims); Letter from Representative Peter T. King to Representative Bennie G.
Thompson (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ny03_king/
kingfirmonradhearings.html ("[T]he homeland has become a major front in the war with
Islamic terrorism and it is our responsibility to fully examine this significant change in al
Qaeda tactics and strategy. To include other groups such as neo-Nazis and extreme
environmentalists in this hearing would be extraneous and diffuse its efficacy. .. . [Tihe
Committee will continue to examine the threat of Islamic radicalization, and I will not allow
political correctness to obscure a real and dangerous threat to the safety and security of the
citizens of the United States.").
267.

See Statement of Muslim Advocates on the King Hearings, MUSLIM ADVOCATES

(Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.muslimadvocates.org/FINAL_Post-HearingMAStmt.pdf;
Letter from Fifty-One Orgs. to Representative Peter T. King (Mar. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.afj.org/press/letter-opposing-house-homeland-secuity-committee-hearing-on-ma
rch-10.pdf (opposing the House Homeland Security Committee's anticipated hearings
regarding American Muslim radicalization); Letter from Wade Henderson et al., The
Leadership Conference, to Representative Peter T. King (Feb. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.civilrights.org/advocacy/letters/201 1/king-hearing-letter-2-4-11 .pdf (arguing that
the radicalization hearings would "likely weaken counterterrorism efforts by ignoring the
long history of Muslim cooperation with law enforcement").
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forms of domestic terrorism since September 11.,,268 Muslim extremists carried
out just five of the eighty-three terrorism incidents between September 11,
2001 and the end of 2010-only six percent.269 Perhaps the error in focusing
on race and religion, rather than criminal activity, was most glaring in 1995
when law enforcement zeroed in on the Arab and Muslim community
immediately following the Oklahoma City bombing. 270 After wasting time and
resources, law enforcement realized the primary suspect was, in fact, a white
male military veteran. 271
The racial subtext of Muslim "terrorist other" 272 as comprising the only
homegrown threat to national security is manifested and perpetuated in various
Purported experts conduct counterterrorism trainings to law
contexts.
enforcement officers with minimal objective qualifications beyond a zealous
belief that there is a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam. Even if
such experts are the minority, their continued employment exposes a failure of
leadership in terms of ensuring those tasked with protecting the nation are well
informed with objective and fact-based trainings.
A similar narrative is perpetuated in the U.S. Congress through homegrown
terrorism hearings focused exclusively on Muslims. Generalizing from a few

268. Peter Bergen & Andrew Lebovich, Editorial, Study Reveals the Many Faces of
Terrorism, CNN (Sept. 9, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-09/opinion/opinion bergen
-lebovich-us-terrorism-cases 1 islamist-qaeda-terrorism?_s=PM:OPINION ("[T]he record
of the past decade suggests that if a chemical, biological or radiological attack were to take
place in the United States, it is more likely that it would come not from a Islamist terrorist
but from a right-wing extremist or anarchist.").
269. Stone, supra note 126 ("There were 60 cases [of terrorism] linked to animal
rights or environmental radicals ... and a dozen to anti-abortion activists.").
270. See Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, A Time to Hate: Situational Antecedents of
Intergroup Bias, 2 ANALYSES Soc. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 61, 64 (2002) (noting that, in the
aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, "media and law enforcement attention
immediately focused on people of supposed Middle Eastern descent"); Girardeau A. Spann,
Terror and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 103-04 & n.57 (2005) (noting that the immediate
U.S. reaction to the Oklahoma City bombing was to blame foreigners and pass antiimmigrant legislation, even though the bombing was carried out by white domestic
terrorists).
271. The case of Timothy McVeigh illustrates that although "terrorist other"
stereotypes predated 9/11, they were largely applied to Arabs. I proffer that these
stereotypes have become further entrenched and applied to a much broader group of people
including South Asians, Sikhs, and anyone perceived as Muslim. See Aziz, supra note 16, at
46-47.
272. See, e.g., Susan Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv.
AM. L. 295, 299 (2002) ("A complex matrix of 'otherness' based on race, national origin,
religion, culture, and political ideology may contribute to the ferocity of the U.S.
government's attacks on the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims.").
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terrorism cases to the collective conduct of millions of Muslim Americans,
these hearings contribute to suspicions of mosques as bastions of extremists,
Muslim charities as supporters of terrorism, and imams as unpatriotic for
refusing to spy on their congregations.
A. CounterterrorismTrainingsPerpetuateEssentialistDefinitions ofMuslims

As law enforcement struggles to prevent the next terrorist attack on U.S.
soil, it adopts essentialist definitions of Muslims as inherently prone to
terrorism. Such a misguided strategy diverts resources, alienates communities,
and may make us less safe.273 This is demonstrated in law enforcement
trainings where government-paid instructors teach those tasked with countering
terrorism that "Islam is a highly violent radical religion that mandates that all of
the earth must be Muslim." 274 The Third Jihad, a film shown to over 1400
NYPD officers in 2010, claims that "[fjew Muslim leaders ... can be trusted"
and that Muslims are engaging in jihad "covertly throughout the West
today."275 The film posits images of Muslim terrorists shooting Christians and
exploding car bombs, executed children covered in sheets, and "a doctored
photograph show[ing] an Islamic flag flying over the White House," all while
276
"[o]minous music" plays in the background.
The NYPD reportedly stopped
showing the film only after a trainee voiced complaints. 27 7 While Mayor
Michael Bloomberg asserted that the NYPD employed "'terrible judgment'" in
showing the film, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly appeared in and was

273. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 126 (citing the director of the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism as saying: "If you overreact by
targeting or perhaps trampling, as reported in New York, on the civil liberties of a group,
that will make you less safe.").
274. Meg Stalcup & Joshua Craze, How We Train Our Cops to Fear Islam, WASH.
MONTHLY, Mar./Apr. 2011, at 20, 21, available at http://www.washingtonnonthly.com/
see also Press Release, Am.-Arab Antifeatures/2011/1103.stalcup-craze.html;
Discrimination Comm., Joint Statement on Meeting with FBI Director Robert Mueller (Feb.
15, 2012), http://www.adc.org/media/press-releases/2012/february-2012/joint-statement-onmeeting-with-fbi-director-robert-mueller/ (noting that FBI Director Mueller stated more than
700 FBI training documents and 300 presentations have been "deemed unusable by the
Bureau and pulled from the training curriculum").
275. See Powell, supra note 34.
276. Id.
277. Bloomberg Blasts Use of Movie During NYPD Training, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24,
2012, 7:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP3734e6cl3f2a4b9b85ef5692766d9088.
html.
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interviewed for the film, knowing that it "was for a documentary on radical
Islam." 278
A 2010 PowerPoint presentation compiled by an intelligence analyst
working at a United States Attorney's office warned Department of Justice
officials that the United States is at war with Islam.279 As the federal
government directs billions of dollars in terrorism-related training grants to
state and local governments, more police officers are exposed to biased
depictions of Muslims and Islam as inherently violent, savage, and anti280
American.20
It should come as no surprise, therefore, when law enforcement
officers act on these stereotypes in their counterterrorism enforcement.
In addition to indoctrinating law enforcement officers to suspect Muslims,
the alarmist tenor of the discourse surrounding "homegrown terrorism"
communicates to the public that Muslims are collectively guilty for the illegal
acts of a handful of individuals. 281 Targeted government prosecutions,
deportations, and profiling validate the public's worst fears about Muslims,
thereby feeding the frenzy of bias. This is despite 2007 and 2011 reports by the
Pew Research Center concluding that "[m]ost Muslim Americans continue to
reject violence and extremism. As in 2007, [in 2011] very few see suicide
bombing and other forms of violence against civilians as ever justified in the
defense of Islam, and al Qaeda is even less popular than it was then." 282

278. E.g., Michael Powell, In Shift, Police Say Leader Helped with Anti-Islam Film
and Now Regrets It, Jan. 25, 2012, at A22, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/
nyregion/police-commissioner-kelly-helped-with-anti-islam-film-and-regrets-it.html.
279. See Spencer Ackerman, Justice Department Official: Muslim 'Juries' Threaten
'Our Values,' WIRED (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/
islamophobia-beyond-fbi/all/1 (reporting that Justice Department officials communicated
that the "U.S. is at war with the Islamic religion").
280. See, e.g., Stalcup & Craze, note 274; Spencer Ackerman, FBI Teaches Agents:
'Mainstream' Muslims Are 'Violent, Radical,' WIRED (Sept. 14, 2011, 8:45 PM), http:!!
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/; Editorial, Sheriff Shows Poor
Judgment in 'Training,' DAILY NEWS J. (Feb. 19, 2012, 1:32 AM), http://www.dnj.com/
article/20120219/OPINIONO1/302190025 (reporting that a Virginia sheriff "organized an
officer training session . . . conducted by a Virginia-based group with dubious intentions and
no government vetting .... whose leaders challenge the constitutional rights of Muslims").
281. See, e.g., William Wan, N.Y Muslims Fear Congressman's Hearings Could
Inflame Islamophobia, WASH. PosT (Jan. 24, 2011, 12:02 AM), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/23/AR2011012304448.html (reporting that
Representative King's hearings "singled out the mosque as a hotbed of 'radical Islam').
282. PEw RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: No SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION
OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM 65 (2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/

legacy-pdf/Muslim-American-Report.pdf.
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Meanwhile, Muslims' proactive actions to prevent terrorism are either
overlooked or dismissed as insufficient.283 Worse yet, law enforcement
officials and other experts who highlight Muslims' contributions to preventing
terrorism may be accused of engaging in apologetic political correctness that
makes the country less safe.284
To be sure, there are American Muslims who attempted to commit terrorist
acts. Examples include Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to bomb Times Square
in New York City in May 2010,285 and Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb
the New York City subway. 28 6 Additionally, Mohamed Osman Mohamud is
accused of attempting to ignite a bomb in a public square in Portland in
November 20 10.287
At the same time, however, other American Muslims played pivotal roles
in preventing these very acts.288 For example, a Senegalese Muslim immigrant

283. Compare KURZMAN, supra note 114, at 5 (reporting that of 120 disrupted plots,
forty-eight involved tips from the Muslim American community), with George Zornick,
Peter King: It's Not Enough for Muslims to 'Denounce all Terrorism,' They Must Also
Denounce Muslims, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 15, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
2011/02/15/king-attacks-muslims/ (reporting Representative King's assertion: "It is not
enough for [Muslim leaders] to say that they denounce all terrorism, that they denounce all
violence .

..

. They have to be much more aggressive." (alteration in original) (emphasis

added)).
284. See Robert Faturechi, Sheriff Baca, GOP Congressman Clash over Baca's
Support of Muslim Group, L.A. TIMEs (Mar. 10, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://latimesblogs.
latimes.com/lanow/2011/03/sheriff-baca-gop-congressman-clash-over-links-to-muslim-grou
p.html (reporting that a congressman warned a Los Angeles sheriff during a congressional
hearing that the Muslim group the sheriff supported was "affiliated with terrorists" and was
"'using' him).
285. Joseph Berger, Times Square Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at MB9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/nyregion/30world.html?r1 &ref-times
squarebombattemptmay 12010.
286. A.G. Sulzberger & William K. Rashbaum, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb
New York Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/02/23/nyregion/23terror.html.
287. Colin Miner et al., F.B.I. Says Oregon Suspect Planned 'Grand' Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/l 1/28/us/
28portland.html?scp=2&sq=Mohamed%200sman%2OMohamed&st-cse; Aaronson, supra
note 50, at 41 ("The Portland case [of Mohamed Osman Mohamud] has been held up as an
example of how FBI stings can make a terrorist where there might have been only an angry
loser. 'This is a kid who, it can be reasonably inferred, barely had the capacity to put his
shoes on in the morning,' [a former FBI agent] says.").
288. See, e.g., Sheila Musaji, American Muslims Cooperation with Law Enforcement,
AM. MUSLIM (Jan. 9, 2012), http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/
communities
american-muslims-cooperation-with-law-enforcement/00 18970 ("Muslim
helped U.S. security officials to prevent nearly 2 out of every 5 Al-Qaeda plots threatening
the United States since 9/11.").
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was the first to report to police the suspicious smoke coming out of the car in
289
In the case of
Times Square where Faisal Shahzad planted his bomb.
Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Mohamud's father personally contacted the local
FBI office expressing concern over his son's deteriorating mental health and
obsession with violent extremist activity.290 Not only was Mohamud's father a
Muslim proactively cooperating with law enforcement, 2 9 1 he risked his son's
liberty to ensure the safety of his fellow Americans.292 The actions of these
Muslim men potentially saved the lives of thousands of people. 29 3 Such cases
highlight that the American Muslim community is like any other: composed of
criminals and law-abiding citizens. The latter should not be collectively
punished for the bad deeds of the former based on false stereotypes of Muslims
as the "terrorist other."
For over ten years, mosques and Muslim civic organizations across the
country have issued numerous press releases and decrees denouncing terrorism
and rejecting any claims that Islam condones terrorism or the killing of
innocent civilians.294 Despite their unequivocal rejection of terrorism in the
289. Alexandra Frean, Car Bomb Found in the Heart of New York; Street Sellers
Raise Alarm After Seeing Smoke Pouringfrom Vehicle, TIMES (London), May 3, 2010; Zaid
Jilani, Media Ignore the Fact that Man Who Alerted Police to Failed Times Square Bombing
Is a Muslim Immigrant, THINKPROGRESS (May 5, 2010, 10:47 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
security/2010/05/05/95219/senagalese-muslim-vendor/.
290. Nina Shapiro, Mohamed Osman Mohamud Was Turned in by His Parents,
Neighbor Says, SEATTLE WKLY. (Nov. 29, 2010, 3:35 PM), http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/
dailyweekly/2010/1 1/mohamed osman mohamud was turn.php.
291. E.g., Zaid Jilani, Suspected Oregon Terror Act yet Another Plot Foiled Because
of Intelligence Provided by a Muslim, THrNKPROGRESS (Nov. 29, 2010, 10:00 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/11/29/132303/oregon-mosque-teenage-terrorism/
("[T]he FBI only began tracking Mohamud thanks to a tip from his Muslim father.").
292. See id.
293. See generally CongressmanLaunching Probe into Local Muslim Radicalization,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2011), http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/jan/16/nation/la-na-americanmuslims-20110116 (reporting that Representative Keith Ellison "offered to volunteer
himself and other witnesses as proof that several terrorist plots-including those in Times
Square and in Virginia-were initially brought to the attention of federal law enforcement by
Muslims"). Similarly, Sami Osmakac was arrested in Florida following a tip from local
Muslims. MPAC Commends Tampa, FL, Muslims Who Helped to Prevent PlannedAttack,
MUSLIM PUB. AFFAIRS COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.mpac.org/programs/hate-crimeprevention/commends-fl-muslims.php.
294. See, e.g., Khalid Hasan, Major US Islamic Group Denounces Terrorism, DAILY
TIMES (May 1, 2006), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\05\01\story 15-2006_pg7_42; Muslim Group Denounces Terror Attacks, Harassment, CNN (Sept. 17,
2001),
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-17/us/gen.hate.crimeslamerican-muslims-arabamerican-muslim-group? s=PM:US; Romesh Ratnesar, The Myth of Homegrown Islamic
Terrorism, TIME (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2044047,
00.html (reporting that violent extremism by U.S. Muslims has not increased and that
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name of Islam, segments of the American public and the government continue
to suspect Muslims en masse as part of the problem.295 Ironically, individual
accountability and responsibility are core American values that set us apart
from other societies where guilt by association is the norm. Thus, the
stereotyping arising from essentialist definitions of homegrown terrorism
should be cause for concern for all Americans.
Holding individuals
accountable for the acts of others within their religious or other identity group
is an affront to fundamental American principles that protect all of us from
undue government interference and irrational bigotry.
B. The FlawedNew York PoliceDepartment Counter RadicalizationReport

Nowhere is the misguided homegrown terrorism policy more glaring than
in the deeply flawed, but highly influential, NYPD report on counter
radicalization. The report unabashedly equates Muslim religiosity with
radicalization toward terrorism. The report states: "In the example of the
homegrown threat, local residents or citizens gradually adopt an extremist
religious/political ideology hostile to the West."296 The report goes on to say,
"Radicalization in the West often starts with individuals who are frustrated with
their lives or with the politics of their home governments," 297 and "Muslims in
the U.S. are more resistant, but not immune to the radical message [of Salafi
Islam]."298

The NYPD report draws broad and faulty conclusions based on a few case
studies and encourages policing activity on the basis of religious conduct
engaged by millions of Muslims.299 For instance, "typical signatures" of
homegrown terrorism include "giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and
urban hip-hop gangster clothes," "wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing
a beard," and "becoming involved in social activism and community issues." 300
The report thus correlates religiosity with violence, further reinforcing the false
stereotype of Muslims as terrorists. In fact, hundreds of millions of Muslims

American Muslims "remain more moderate, diverse and integrated than the Muslim
populations in any other Western society").
295. See, e.g., Morgan Chesky, Radio Ad Refuses Service to Obama Supporters,
Muslims, KVUE.coM (Oct. 27, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://www.kvue.com/news/Radio-ad(reporting that a Texas
refuses-service-to-Obama-supporters-Muslims-132748178.html
man's radio advertisement expressly refused service to Muslims, stating "[tihe fact is if you
are a devout Muslim then you cannot be a true American").
296. SILBER & BHATr, supra note 34, at 16.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 8.
299. See id. at 23-56.
300. Id. at 33.
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worldwide are devout followers of their faith and reject terrorism and violence
301
in general.
While many Muslim terrorists are motivated by political objectives, the
NYPD report effectively recasts the religion of Islam as a political movement,
thereby legitimizing harsh investigative and prosecutorial techniques otherwise
unconstrained by anti-profiling and anti-discrimination policies.302 The focus
on religious beliefs rather than indicia of terrorism causes law enforcement and
the public to misinterpret mundane Islamic practices as leading indicators of
terrorist inclinations.
The NYPD report's significance lies not only in its inaccurate content, but
that it has become a template for other law enforcement "counter
radicalization" campaigns. 303 As a consequence, the report serves as a baseline
for many federal agencies struggling to develop a cohesive and comprehensive
strategy to counter "homegrown terrorism," which has become acceptably
restricted to terrorism committed only by Muslims. 304

301.

See ABU DHABI GALLUP CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE
30 (2011), available at http://www.abudhabigallupcenter.com/File/148772/MAR
Report ADGC en-US_071911_saLRweb.pdf (showing poll in which eighty-nine percent
of Muslim Americans reject violent individual attacks on civilians, compared with seventyone percent of Protestant, seventy-one percent of Catholic, seventy-five percent of Jewish,
seventy-nine percent of Mormon, and seventy-six percent of atheist/agnostic Americans);
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM
POPULATION 7 (2011), available at features.pewforum.org/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulationWebPDF.pdf (noting that there are nearly 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide in 2010).
302. There is no federal law prohibiting racial profiling within the law enforcement
context. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S
COMMITMENT TO RACE NEUTRALITY INLAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 1 (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CRCL MemoCommitmentRaceNeutralityJune04.pdf
(citing CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE
BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 9 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_onrace.pdf); see also Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed
to the Terrorist: Muslim American Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 8
FUTURE

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 10), available at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1981777.
303. See Timothy Connors, Putting the "L" into Intelligence-Led Policing: How
Police Leaders Can Leverage Intelligence Capability, 22 J. INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 237, 237 (2009) ("The [NYPD Radicalization Report] provides
tangible evidence that the police agencies of major cities and states are effectively building
their ability to collect and analyze information.").
304. See Letter from Representative Peter T. King to Representative Bennie G.
Thompson, supra note 266; see also David A. Fahrenthold & Michelle Boorstein, Rep. Peter
King's Muslim Hearing: Plenty of Drama, Less Substance, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/peter-king-tempers-rhetoric-on-muslims-as-congres
sional-hearing-gets-under-way/2011/03/1 0/ABhV3BQstory.html.
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C. The Post-9/11 Un-American Activities Hearings

The NYPD report contributed to a controversial series of congressional
hearings scrutinizing Muslim Americans as collectively suspect of terrorist
inclinations. In the spring of 2011, Representative Peter King, Chairman of the
House Committee on Homeland Security, initiated a series of hearings on
homegrown terrorism. 3 05 He stated his point clearly and unequivocally:
American Muslims have not done enough to cooperate with law enforcement in
countering terrorism.306 When criticized for limiting his focus on homegrown
terrorism to Muslims, Representative King insisted that expanding the focus to
all acts of terrorism in the United States would be unproductive; instead, the
primary threat lays within the American Muslim communities. 307
An integral part of King's strategy to vilify Muslims is to accuse Muslim
imams of obstructing law enforcement counterterrorism efforts 3o
notwithstanding their participation in numerous community outreach meetings
over the past ten years. 309 According to Representative King, the imams were
not doing enough to identify and report terrorism within their congregations to
law enforcement. Indeed, he even went so far as to accuse mosques across the
country of harboring terrorists.310

305.

See King Opens Committee on Homeland Security Hearing on Radicalization,

CONGRESSMAN PETE KING (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ny03

king/openshomelandhearingonrad.html.
306. See id. ("Muslim community leaders (and) religious leaders must play a more
visible role in discrediting and providing alternatives to violent Islamist ideology." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
307. See Letter from Representative Peter T. King to Representative Bennie G.
Thompson, supra note 266 ("[T]he homeland has become a major front in the war with
Islamic terrorism and it is our responsibility to fully examine this significant change in al
Qaeda tactics and strategy. To include other groups such as neo-Nazis and extreme
environmentalists in this hearing would be extraneous and diffuse its efficacy. . . . [T]he
Committee will continue to examine the threat of Islamic radicalization, and I will not allow
political correctness to obscure a real and dangerous threat to the safety and security of the
citizens of the United States."); King Opens Committee on Homeland Security Hearing on
Radicalization,supra note 305 ("There is no equivalency of threat between al Qaeda and
neo-Nazis, environmental extremists or other isolated madmen.").
308. See PATEL, supra note 165, at 23 ("To date, despite concerns about the
legitimacy of the government's counterterrorism efforts (and contrary to the unsubstantiated
claims made by Rep. Peter King in justifying his controversial radicalization hearings),
American Muslims have an exemplary record of cooperating with law enforcement agencies
on counterterrorism efforts." (endnote omitted)).
309. See discussionsupra Part I.C.
310. See Ramos, supra note 30 (reporting that Representative King has repeatedly
asserted "80 percent of U.S. mosques are controlled by radicals and could be harboring
terrorists").
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Representative King's homegrown terrorism campaign, appropriately
termed "McCarthyite" and a "witchhunt" by some,311 has two fundamental
flaws. First, allegations of a lack of cooperation by Muslim Americans are
directly contradicted by the facts. 312 Second, the demand for religious leaders
to serve as deputies of the FBI or state and local law enforcement sets a
dangerous precedent that threatens America's core principle of the separation
of church and state.
Since 9/11, there have been numerous meetings held between law
enforcement and Muslim communities across the country.313 Imams from the
local communities routinely attend these meetings. 3 14 Notwithstanding the
serious structural flaws with the outreach campaigns discussed supra Part I,
many Muslim leaders attend in hopes of protecting their communities from
collective punishment.315 As a Senior Policy Advisor in the Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties at the Department of Homeland Security, the author
of this article personally witnessed the genuine concern expressed by Muslims
regarding the sabotage of their religion by violent extremists who misinterpret
Islam to commit political violence.

311. See, e.g., Eugene Robinson, PeterKing's Modern-Day Witch Hunt, WASH. POST,
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR20
11031005934.html.
312. See KURZMAN, supra note 114, at 5 (reporting that of 120 disrupted plots, fortyeight involved tips from the Muslim American community); Dina Temple-Raston, Imam
Arrests Show Shift in Muslim Outreach Effort, NPR (July 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/
2011/07/19/137767710/imam-arrests-show-shift-in-muslim-outreach-effort (quoting the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Wifredo Ferrer, as stating "[w]e have found
that Muslim and Arab community members have been really helpful in informing us and
disrupting plots against the United States").
313. See, e.g., PATEL, supra note 165, at 26 ("[E]ven the best-coordinated outreach
efforts are unlikely to succeed when paired with an approach to radicalization that
emphasizes intelligence-gathering about religious behaviors and practices.").
314. See, e.g., Temple-Raston, supra note 312 ("They already had a relationship with
leaders in the Muslim community. They had already attended prayers in some of their
mosques. They'd had dinners to meet mosque members and U.S. Attorney's Office
employees.").
315. See, e.g., Jon Jordan, CAIR Says FBI Cutting Ties Hurts Efforts in Local
Communities, NEWSON6.coM (Mar. 26, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.newson6.com/Global/
story.asp?S= 14328429 (reporting that the director of the Council on American-Islamic
Relations' Oklahoma chapter said the FBI's decision to cut ties with the organization is
hurting the community); William Yardley & Jessie McKinley, Terror Cases Strain Ties with
Some Who Can Help, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at Al5, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
12/01/us/0ltrust.html.
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Religious leaders continue to condemn terrorism and communicate their
interest in keeping safe all Americans. 3
Indeed, the largest Muslim
organizations in America have explicitly and consistently condemned terrorism
committed in the name of Islam, and usually do so within hours of a reported
attempted terrorist plot. 317 As evinced by the thousands of press releases,
reports, public statements, and commentaries produced since 9/11,318 there is
no reasonable basis for concluding that Muslim leaders and organizations are
not interested in counterterrorism and ensuring the safety of all Americans.
Thus, Representative King's broad conclusion that Muslim imams do not
cooperate with the government ought to be recognized for what it really is:
inflammatory political posturing.
The silver lining in the homegrown terrorism debate is the broad coalition
of groups that have rejected King's presumptions of collective Muslim
culpability. Christian, Jewish, and civil rights groups representing a diversity
of demographics challenged the merits of limiting "homegrown terrorism" to
terrorism committed only by Muslims.319
316. See, e.g., Press Release, Religions for Peace, World Summit of Religious
Leaders, Baku (Apr. 29, 2010), http://religionsforpeace.org/news/press/press-release-worldsummit.html (reporting that senior religious leaders from Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish
and Muslim faiths jointly "condemned terrorism and any attempts to use religion for
destructive purposes").
317. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, PERSISTENT AND CONSISTENT
CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM (2011), available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/CAIR
%20on%20Terrorism.pdf (listing eighty-four press releases in which CAIR specifically
condemned terrorism from 1994 to 2008); COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, RESPONSE
TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS (updated 2007), available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/

0/pdf/September 11_statements.pdf (compiling in sixty-eight pages a sampling of all
condemnations of 9/11 attacks by Muslims from around the world, including from CAIR and
other American Muslim organizations);

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC

RELATIONS,

ISLAMIC STATEMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM: RESPONSE TO JULY 7TH 2005 LONDON BOMBINGS

(2005), available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/CondemnationofLondonBomb
ings.pdf; see also CAIR: Muslims Condemn Hate Vandalism ofMd. Synagogue, COUNCIL ON
AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (July 28, 2010, 11:44 AM), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.
aspx?midl=777&&ArticlelD=26533&&name=n&&currPage-4; CAIR Condemns Plot to
Kill Police, Attacks on Subway, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (Mar. 29, 2010, 12:26

PM), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?midl=777&&ArticlelD=26336&&name=n&
&currPage=8; MPAC Condemns 'Horrific Outburst of Violence' in Fort Hood, TX, MUSLIM
PUB. AFFAIRS COUNCIL (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.mpac.org/press/press-releases/mpaccondemns-horrific-outburst-of-violence-in-forth-hood-tx.php; U.S. Muslims Condemn Attack
at Fort Hood, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (Nov. 5, 2009, 6:15 PM), http:/www.

cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?midl=777&&ArticlelD=26126&&name=n&&currPage=1 3.
318. See sources cited supra note 317; see also CAIR's Anti-Terrorism Campaigns,
COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, http://www.cair.com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerror

ism.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
319. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 165; Press Release,
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Unfortunately, insufficient attention was paid to the importance of allowing
Muslims, and Americans, in general, to express political dissent openly despite
the unpopularity of their views.320 Instead, many Muslim groups and their
allies sought to reassure the public of Muslim loyalty and their status as a
"model minority." 321 Rather than focusing on the right of all Americans,
including Muslims, to be radical within the limits of the law, some Muslim
groups reacted with undue restraint by adopting Representative King's
narrative to shape Muslim political beliefs and religious practices in accordance
with a citizenry overly docile toward its government.322
Indeed, the
homegrown terrorism hearings were a missed opportunity to refocus the issue
on the fundamental American right to hold unpopular or controversial views,
rather than prove the innocence of a suspected religious minority.
D. DeputizingMuslim Imams to Do the Government's Bidding

Equally disconcerting, Representative King demanded that religious
leaders perform the work of law enforcement-a misguided policy that sets a
dangerous precedent of undermining the independence of religion from the
state.323 It is reasonable to ask citizens to report crimes when they see them, as
this keeps all Americans collectively safer. The statistics indicate, moreover,
that Muslims are doing precisely that. 32 4

Kristen Ford, Faith in Public Life, 80+ Long Island Faith Leaders Call on Rep. Peter King to
Cancel Muslim Hearings (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.faithinpubliclife.org/newsroom/press/
80 longisland faith leaders c/.
320. See, e.g., John Bentley, Muslim Leader in King's District Issues Warning, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 10, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500803_162-20041716500803.html (reporting that a Muslim leader warned Representative King that the
radicalization hearings would endanger U.S. troops and citizens abroad, without mentioning
Muslims' own civil and constitutional rights).
321. Cf Miranda Oshige McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the "Model Minority
Myth, " 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 331 (2006).
322. See Bentley, supra note 320; Temple-Raston, supra note 312 (reporting that a
Florida Muslim community did not become outraged or hold demonstrations when the FBI
arrested two of its imams, but instead handled the matter in a way that "is being lauded as a
model for the way law enforcement and communities should work together").
323. See Zornick, supra note 283.
324. See, e.g., KURZMAN, supra note 114, at 5; Zaid Jilani, As King Targets Muslims,
There Have Been Almost Twice as Many Plots Since 9/11 from Non-Muslim Terrorists,
THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 9, 2011, 6:05 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/03/09/
149537/king-muslims-plots-terrorists/ ("[N]early 4 in 10 Al-Qaida related plots in the United
States have been broken up thanks to intelligence provided by the Muslim community
themselves and 70 percent of recent terror plots in the United States have been foiled by help
from Muslim Americans.").
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However, King and his allies are calling for much more than merely
reporting unlawful activity about which one has knowledge. Representative
King seeks to, in effect, deputize religious leaders to perform the work of the
FBI and police. 32 5 He appears to have no qualms requiring religious leaders to
spy on their congregants and affirmatively search for illegal activity absent
knowledge of specific illegal acts.326 Putting religious leaders in such a
predicament is not only arguably unconstitutional 327 and contrary to most
clergy-parishioner privilege doctrines, 32 8 but it also breaches the sanctimonious
trust between the spiritual leader and his or her congregants.
If this problematic practice becomes the norm, it will eventually become
acceptable for religious leaders' loyalty to lie more with the state than the deity
they worship. Thus, the erosion of the complete separation 32 9 between the
state's governance role and religion's spiritual role has implications much
broader than the constitutional rights of Muslims. It risks transforming the
American way of life for the worse-the very thing we sought to stop the 9/11
terrorists from accomplishing.
E. From Racial Subtexts to PalpableDiscrimination

Finally, the ongoing discourse on homegrown terrorism has facilitated
3 30
Words matter
palpable discrimination against Muslims in various contexts.
325. See Zornick, supra note 283 (reporting Representative King's opinions on what
Muslim leaders must do).
326. Id
327. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .").
328. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2007) ("Unless the person confessing
or confiding waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any religion . .. shall not
be allowed [to] disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his professional character
as spiritual advisor."); see also Clergy Privilege, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/
privacy/privileges/#Clergy (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) ("Most states, if not all, have statutes
protecting the conversations between a clergy member and the communicant.").
329. Few American principles are more renowned than Thomas Jefferson's vision of a
"wall of separation between Church & State" created by the First Amendment's
establishment clause. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1,
1802), availableat http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
330. See, e.g., Alex Dobuzinskis, Southwest Apologizes to Muslim Booted off Plane,
REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2011, 7:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-planeapology-idUSTRE72F9NN20110316?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reporting
that a Muslim woman was kicked off an airplane because a crew member mistook her as
saying "It's a go" to someone on her cell phone when she in fact said "I've got to go"); Hate
Map, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map (last visited
Jan. 10, 2012) (detailing the number of organizations in the United States that are dedicated
to anti-Muslim activities); Jerry Markon, Justice Department Sues on Behalf of Muslim
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because words influence behavior. The more American elected officials focus
on Muslims in the context of suspected terrorists, the more the public knows
Muslims only in the context of terrorism. As a result, "a significant minority of
Americans doubt U.S. Muslims' loyalty to their country." 331 Muslims in
America are thus no longer perceived as ordinary citizens with ordinary lives,
but rather as terrorists in waiting, threatening the lives of their neighbors. The
bigoted rhetoric exemplified by individuals like Representative King only
solidifies stereotypes of the "terrorist other," whereby Muslims are inherently
violent, disloyal, and forever foreign regardless of their American citizenship or
American birthplace. 332 Even Muslims who have gone to great lengths to
assimilate into American culture by changing their names to Americanized
versions are monitored by law enforcement as potential terrorists.33 3 Indeed,
this long-practiced "rite of assimilation" is now seen "as a possible red flag in
the hunt for terrorists." 334
Numerous reports over the past ten years illustrate how such stereotypes
directly contribute to tangible discrimination in various contexts. In 2010, for
example, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee reported a
significant rise in complaints of discrimination against Muslims. 335 The
increasing anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric-presumably attributable to
backlash from the Park 51 Community Center controversy-produced the
highest number of discrimination complaints since 2003.336 Nearly fifty
percent of the complaints involved selective immigration enforcement or
Teacher, TriggeringDebate, WASH. PosT (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/justice-department-sues-on-behalf-of-muslim-teacher-triggering-debate/2011/03/16/
ABfSPtEB story.html?hpid=z5 (reporting the case of an Illinois school district that refused
to grant a Muslim woman time off to make pilgrimage to Mecca).
331. See ABU DHABI GALLUP CTR., supra note 301, at 35 (showing that roughly forty
percent of Catholic, Protestant, and Mormon Americans polled believed Muslim Americans
are not loyal to the United States); see also Ahmed Rehab, Let's Face It: It's the Radical
Right, Not Islam, That Is the Greatest Threat to the American Way, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
16, 2011 1:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ahmed-rehab/lets-face-it-its-the-radi-b
1 144842.html (commenting that Islamophobes share the following sentiment toward Muslim
leaders and organizations: .'[W]e hate you because you are terror-linked, but when you're
not, we need you to be terror-linked so we can hate you"').
332. See Aziz, supra note 16, at 33-35.
333. NYPD Keeps Files on Muslims Who Change Their Names, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26,
2011, 7:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP99772be873ea48c2a8cl 13e55c74dfcc.html
("Monitoring name changes illustrates how the threat of terrorism now casts suspicion over
what historically has been part of America's story.").
334. Id.
335.

See AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., THE 2010 ADC LEGAL REPORT:

LEGAL ADVOCACY & POLICY REVIEW 2 (2011), available at http://adc.org/fileadmin/ADC/
Pdfs/2010_ADC Legal Report.pdf.
336. Id.
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employment discrimination, ranging from individuals being called offensive
ethnic slurs to unfair demotions or dismissals in the employment context.337
Further, the combination of negative images of Arabs and Muslims in the
media 338 with the government's racial profiling and preventive practices has
deeply entrenched invidious stereotypes of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians
in the workplace.339 As recently as February 2011, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission noted the significant increase of discrimination
against Muslims, notwithstanding the passage of ten years since 9/11.340
Instances of discrimination include allegations that employers refused to hire
Muslim women because they wore headscarves, and in other cases, employees
were subjected to offensive, ethnic slurs by coworkers or supervisors.341
This discrimination extends beyond the workplace, however. In December
2010 alone, at least three cases of physical attacks on Muslim women were
reported. 342 In October 2011, a Christian group passed out anti-Muslim fliers at
local high schools.343 The fliers read, "Muslims become increasingly more
aggressive," "[w]e must defend students from being recruited and radicalized
into Islam," and "Ayatollah Khomeini had sex with a 4-year-old girl."344 And
in Texas, a radio advertisement for a concealed handgun class included a
disclaimer from the instructor refusing to teach any "socialist liberal," "nonChristian Arab or Muslim," as well as anyone who voted for President Barack
Obama. 345
337. Id. at 2-3.
338. But see All-American Muslim (TLC television broadcast series, premiered Nov.
13, 2011), the first reality show depicting Muslims as ordinary people with diverse beliefs
and lifestyles. Unfortunately, TLC has received threats demanding that it stop airing the
show because it misinforms viewers about the serious threat regarding the terrorist
inclinations of all Muslims. Sheila Musaji, American Companies Accused ofJoining the AllAmerican Anti-Muslim Bandwagon, AM. MUSLIM (Dec. 20, 2011), http://theamerican
muslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/all-american-muslim/0018896.
339. See notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
340. See Questions and Answers About the Workplace Rights of Muslims, Arabs,
South Asians, and Sikhs Under the Equal Employment OpportunityLaws, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/backlash-employee.cfm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2012).
341. Id.
342. See Barry Leibowitz, Anti-Muslim Hate Crime? Woman Says She Was Followed
by Car,Pepper-SprayedNear Ohio Mosque, CBS NEWS (Dec. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083 162-20026330-504083.html (reporting that a Muslim
woman was "attacked with pepper spray outside an Ohio mosque," while "the attacker told
her to leave the country"); see also Aziz, supra note 302 (manuscript at 45-48).
343. Anti-Muslim Fliers at Schools Spark Debate, 10NEWS.COM (Oct. 6, 2011, 6:32
PM), http://www.1Onews.com/news/29413023/detail.html.
344. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. Chesky, supra note 295 (internal quotation marks omitted).

490

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

Anti-Muslim bias is no longer an arguably reflexive response to a
traumatic terrorist attack against America. Nor is it merely short-term
backlash. It has mutated into a more insidious and permanent fixture in
American race politics where Muslims are arguably the most disfavored
minority in America.346 The bias can no longer be attributed to random acts by
individuals, but must be viewed as part of the broader structural and
institutional inequities facing racial and religious minorities. To be sure, much
of this can be attributed to the government's preventive and selective
counterterrorism model.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ten years after 9/11, the U.S. government's preventive counterterrorism

strategy has cost billions of taxpayer dollars and diverted thousands of law
enforcement personnel from preventing nonterrorism related crimes, while
failing to prevent some of the most serious terrorist attacks committed by
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.347 Rather than partaking in responsible
governance and reassessing its strategies, the government employs fear-based
narratives to persuade the public to continue pouring billions into the national
security system.
While countering terrorism is no easy feat, it is remarkable that the
government was unable to prevent some major attempted attacks after having

invested so many resources into counterterrorism, often at the expense of civil
liberties of all Americans.

Despite the creation of fusion spy centers

nationwide, the relaxation of surveillance laws, the use of technology to peer
into nearly every aspect of American life, and the reallocation of thousands of
agents to countering terrorism, the government has yet to show results
proportionate to the vested resources. 348 In the apt words of David Cole and
Jules Lobel, we have become both less safe and less free. 349

346. See Jaihyun Park et al., Implicit Attitudes Toward Arab-Muslims and the
Moderating Effects of Social Information, 29 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 35 (2007)
(noting implicit bias among Americans in favor of white- and black-sounding names over
Arab- and Muslim-sounding names).
347. The FBI reportedly spends nearly $3.3 billion annually on counterterrorism
alone. Aaronson, supra note 50, at 32; see also Smarter NationalSecurity Spending, BILL OF
RIGHTS DEF. COMM. 1, http://www.bordc.org/lobbyday/budget.pdf (last visited Jan. 10,
2012) (identifying at least $20 billion in potential federal agency spending cuts for national
security during the fiscal year of 2010 to 2011).
348. See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America, WASH. POST,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-americal (last updated Dec. 20, 2010).
349. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 2.
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What these strategies accomplish quite well, however, is the stigmatization
of more than 2.5 million Muslim Americans 350 because of the illegal acts of a
handful of Muslims-many of whom are foreign and have no ties whatsoever
to the United States or its law-abiding Muslim communities. Many American
Muslims feel they live a second-class existence because their houses of worship
are under surveillance;351 they believe their Internet activity is more likely to be
under intensified scrutiny for any signs of radical dissent; 35 2 and their religious
practices are under the microscope by purported terrorist experts who cannot
tell the difference between orthodox Islamic practices and bona fide terrorist
activity. 3 53 Muslim women's religious headwear is perceived as an illicit
Shariahization of America. 354 That American Muslims are so distrusted to
warrant a hearing focused solely on questioning their loyalty harkens back to
darker days when the House Un-American Activities Committee questioned the
loyalty of persons based on their political ideology.355
Predictably, what started out as a focus on vulnerable religious and racial
minorities has now spread to a broader segment of Americans. Laws
prohibiting material support to terrorism-initially applied only to Muslim
individuals and institutions-are increasingly enforced against individuals and
institutions engaged in humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, and human rights
advocacy. 356 Non-Muslim activist groups who have been engaged in legitimate
advocacy for decades are now targeted for investigation and potential
prosecution pursuant to material support laws. 357 A combination of public
350. See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Number of U.S. Muslims to Double, USA TODAY
(Jan. 27 2011, 2:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.comnews/religion/2011-01-27-lAmuslim27_
ST_N.htm (reporting that the American Muslim population is currently 2.6 million).
351. See John Doyle et al., Anti-Terror Program 'Kept New York Safe,' NYPD Says,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-24/local/2994
3085 lterror-plots-cia-nypd-s-intelligence-unit. For example, after news media reports
exposed the New York City Police Department's pervasive spying on mosques, one New
York City mosque-goer responded by stating "[flrom now on, I can't feel safe in my own
mosque because someone might be sitting behind me spying." Id.
352. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance
Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION
GENDER & CLASS 375, 376 (2007).
353. See, e.g., Stalcup & Craze, supra note 274; Ackerman, supra note 280.
354. Aziz, supra note 302 (manuscript at 2-3).
355. See, e.g., Alan I. Bigel, The FirstAmendment and National Security: The Court
Responds to Governmental Harassment of Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 885, 889 (1993) ("The authorizing resolution to the House Un-American Activities
Committee ... conferred far-reaching discretion to investigate alleged un-American
activities in the United States.").
356. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
357. See FBI Infiltrator of Anti-War Group Exposed as More Activists Face
Subpoenas, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/
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apathy regarding civil liberties, pervasive stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists,
and government misinformation about the efficacy of counterterrorism policies
has facilitated adoption of practices commonly found in police states. 358
It is long overdue for Americans to reassess the successes and failures of
counterterrorism policies over the past ten years. Are we safer or are we just
lucky? 359 Has the PATRIOT Act made our government better able to prevent
terrorism? Is it time for Americans, as many congressional leaders of both
parties have proclaimed, to thoughtfully debate the efficacy of the PATRIOT
Act and whether its infringements on the civil liberties of all Americans are
warranted? 360 Are we seeking to rationalize our forfeiture of civil liberties by
convincing ourselves that our national security policies work, irrespective of
the facts on the ground? If we cannot answer these questions based on
evidence, rather than fear-based speculation, then we have little to account for
the last ten years of significant government expenditure, public anxiety, and
civil liberties costs.
To be sure, individuals engaged in illegal acts should be prosecuted
regardless of their demographic. However, the cases mentioned in this article
raise serious concerns as to whether the religion and ethnicity of individuals,
specifically their Muslim faith, is more determinative than suspected unlawful
conduct when allocating limited counterterrorism resources.
In light of our nation's checkered civil rights record and ample opportunity
to learn from the past, there is simply no excuse for repeating the same
mistakes, but with a different vulnerable minority group. Preventing a terrorist
attack need not come at the expense of the vilification of a religious minority.
Nor should it require sacrificing Americans' most fundamental civil rights and
liberties. History has repeatedly shown that it is only a matter of time before
such invidious practices spread to other unpopular groups.
news/FBI InfiltratorAntiWar Group ExposedActivistsSubpoenas.
358. See Shahid Buttar, Preventive Detention, at What Cost?, HUFFINGTON PosT (July
13, 2009, 6:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shahid-buttar/preventive-detention-atw b_230302.html.
359. See, e.g., Bartosiewicz, supra note 67 ("[T]here's little evidence that [these new
investigative techniques and powers] make us safer. On the contrary, in every instance since
9/11 when an actual terrorist attack has been attempted, it failed not because of enhanced
law-enforcement initiatives but as a result of the perpetrator's incompetence. The 2002
'Shoe Bomber,' Richard Reid, was thwarted by an alert stewardess in his attempt to light
homemade explosives hidden in his sneakers . . .; the 2009 'Underwear Bomber,' Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, failed to ignite the plastic explosives sewn into his underwear ... ;
and the 2010 'Times Square Bomber' Faisal Shahzad's homemade explosive device ...
simply didn't detonate." (emphasis added)).
360. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Rand Paul to Members of the U.S. Senate (Feb. 15,
2011), available at http://www.randpaul2010.com/images/Patriot%2OAct%2ODear%20
Colleague.pdf (expressing opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act).

